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Contextualizing Impermanence:

Reevaluating the planning paradigms of Rohingya Refugee Camps in Bangladesh

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Contextualizing Impermanence:

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by

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Dedication

Ammu: for hardly spoiling me, for teaching me how to pave my own way,

Abbu: for spoiling me and trying his best to clear paths for me till his last breath.

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I am forever indebted and grateful to all the people who have dedicated their time to participate in this study and supported me in whichever way possible to complete the study.

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Abbu: I know wherever you are now, you are proud of my every little achievement. You prepared me for all of this, and I wish you were here to share these moments with me.

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Abstract

Contextualizing Impermanence:

Reevaluating the planning paradigms of Rohingya Refugee Camps in Bangladesh

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The current planning paradigms of Rohingya refugee camps lie at the intersection of impermanence and adhocracy. This study seeks to explore the extent to which adhocracy has contributed to a strategy of impermanence in the Rohingya refugee camp, and how adhocracy has limited recognition of the human rights of Rohingya refugees and served to discount the spirit of the Rohingya community as reflected in their everyday practices. The study underscores the fact that refugees are seen as subjects of exclusion, blurring the line between permanence and impermanence in the planning domain. Also, by pursuing strategies of negotiation and appropriation of space as part of everyday practices, Rohingya refugees do not accept their status as refugees nor do they wish to be incorporated into the host community.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

My life

Here's my life in brief . . .
I was a frog in a well,
A prisoner in the jail of fresh air.
In the dark, dark cosmos,
No days, just nights, nights.

A small cormorant survives
the genocidal waves
by being flung, crashing
into the world's strangeness.

Storm of racism, of hate —
This is my life.

Just like an action movie
In which you are the gangster.
Just like an actor who cannot discover his lines.

In Arakan, they kill and bury you
under the treasure of human rights

—Farooq Pacifist (Bryne, n.d.)

Farooq's poem reflects his life journey as a Rohingya, from witnessing dark days as a victim of statelessness, structural exclusion, racism, persecution, war crimes and genocide in his own country of Myanmar to living a life as a refugee, barely surviving, traumatized, confined to an uncertain existence in the Kutupalong-Balukhali Extension Camp, the world's largest refugee camp in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. This story is not only Farooq's: his words reflect the situation of most Rohingya refugees, who are among the most persecuted ethnic minorities in the world. Rohingyas, a Muslim minority ethnic group, has been enduring persecution by the ruling junta of Myanmar, a predominantly Buddhist country. Their sufferings have been ignored by the international community for

over five decades, making them 'the world's most friendless people' (Tharoor, 2017). From late 2017 to early 2018, around 700,000 Rohingya crossed the borders between Bangladesh and Myanmar to escape an aggressive Myanmar military campaign that devastated hundreds of Rohingya villages in Rakhine state in Myanmar. The Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh, the only country that left its border open during this crisis, and joined 200,000 more Rohingyas in the refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, who had previously fled to Bangladesh to evade Myanmar's state-sponsored persecution and abuses. Over the course of only five months, a hilly forest area in Cox's Bazar became a mega refugee settlement with a population larger than Lyon, France's third-largest city. Rohingya refugees in the overcrowded camps soon became vulnerable to the risks from landslides, floods, disease outbreaks, and tensions within the community (UNHCR, n.d.). Providing sustainable and resilient lives for these large influxes of Rohingya people has become a great challenge for Bangladesh.

In our globalized world, the movement of people often has been seen as a threat to individual nations' perceived security and collective resources. Billions of dollars are being invested in the mapping, enclosing, and bounding of territories, dramatically restricting the movement of people (Jones, 2016). Therefore, when people are forced to flee from war, racial and political intolerance, or natural disasters to seek refuge in other countries, they fall under national and international law instruments that decide their 'status', 'rights' and 'dignity' by which their social power in the host society will be defined. At this moment, the world is witnessing the highest level of displacement on record, with 30 million refugees trapped in refugee settlements or camps, sometimes for several generations (United Nations, n.d.).

By framing the displacement of people fleeing war, persecution, and violence as a short-term problem, refugee camps emerged to offer acute and temporary accommodation and services to displaced refugees. The hope was that every conflict would be successfully resolved through dialogue and policymaking and that every refugee would either go back to his/her country, would relocate to another country, or would gain citizenship in the host country. However, geopolitical realities have compelled refugees to live in a refugee camp on average for 17 years per UN estimates (Sabie et. al, 2017). Even after 'successful' resettlements, refugee camps often remain the place where they had the longest and stable period of 'residency' (Tang, 2015). These realities have led to the question, do temporary arrangements for refugees allow them to live their lives as dignified human beings?

Refugee camps have been treated as a space that denotes extraterritoriality, exception, and exclusion. This has led refugee camps to be viewed as places to keep refugees captive, detached from the outside 'normal' world, and only allowed to live a 'bare life,' merely existing without social, political, and economic power. However, another view imagines refugee camps as sources of resiliency neoliberalism, where refugees are turned into neoliberal citizens who can adapt to the camp environment and assume responsibility to transform the camp into a community, but without challenging the status quo. I argue that these two perspectives of the camp are not mutually exclusive. They both play vital roles in shaping everyday decisions in terms of refugee camp planning and development, and also serve to reproduce the rationality of impermanence in refugee camp planning. Drawing inspiration from Turner (2015) and Simone (2008), I argue that "the de-politicization of the life in refugee camp paradoxically produces hyper-politicized space where nothing is taken for granted and everything is contested" (Turner, 2015, p.139). Hence refugees are not devoid of agency. Instead, they should be understood as one of the

actors in the planning field, whose everyday practices and cultural and spatial appropriation of the socio-spatial environment provide them with the capacity to frustrate or facilitate planning outcomes. My research questions are, therefore: (1) How is the notion of impermanence materialized through the development and management of Rohingya refugee settlements in Bangladesh?; (2) How do refugees negotiate these development and management approaches, and (3) What does this agency entail for planning with refugees and other transient populations?

To examine these questions, I employed ethnographic research methods to document the underlying planning challenges and refugees' everyday practices in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, Chittagong, Bangladesh. The research methods included mapping, observation, and semi-structured interviews with 15 Rohingya refugees and 13 professional experts including planners, architects, engineers, researchers, aid organizations, and NGO workers working inside and outside of the camp. Pseudonyms are used in this study in order to protect the identity of the interview participants. I conducted my study from June to August 2019, which allowed me to document the struggles of the Rohingya refugees during two different extreme seasons in Bangladesh: summer and monsoon. I spent three weeks in Cox's Bazar, traveling every day except local holidays to camp early in the morning and returning in the evening, as visitors are not allowed to stay in the camps overnight. I spent my days in the Rohingya refugee camp observing and taking field notes and photographs, and interviewing refugees and experts who work within the refugee camp. Over the course of another four weeks, I interviewed professionals who work remotely on different projects in the camp. Through my interviews and observations, I sought to document what factors and what actors shape planning decisions,

implementation, and outcomes in order to more broadly understand how the assumption of impermanence affects or is affected by refugee camp planning practices.

It took a long time to secure interviews with refugees, as they were not comfortable sharing their experiences with an outsider they just met. I spent three days visiting two women-friendly spaces in two different camps to build a relationship of familiarity and trust. I also attended an international workshop titled 'Rohingya Crisis in Bangladesh: Challenges and Resolutions' organized by the Department of Anthropology, University of Chittagong, to gain an understanding of how local researchers are engaged with the production of knowledge around the Rohingya refugee crisis. My random conversations with rickshaw pullers, taxi drivers, and restaurant workers while I was in Cox's Bazar and Chittagong also helped me to understand the perspectives of the host community, especially the perspectives of the working class about the Rohingya refugees. The limitations of my study include the absence of perspectives of government officials and the lack of Rohingya male perspectives about life in a refugee camp. Being a female researcher conducting a study in a conservative patriarchal refugee society, I was not afforded the opportunity to interact with Rohingya male refugees. Only five of the 15 Rohingya refugee interviewees were male, and I was only able to get in contact with them only through the help of a local NGO. My requests to interview Bangladeshi government officials were denied.

As a professional focusing on the development of the built environment both as a planner and as an architect, my scholarly and professional commitments are rooted in promoting the evolution of humane urbanism. This is a form of urbanism where, rather than following hegemonic planning practices, planning, and design practices are directed

towards creating just cities that celebrate the culture and histories of diverse communities, recognizing local level knowledge production, and providing spaces for equitable participation in planning and design processes (Okitasari, 2016; Miraftab, 2016). The current world that is torn with wars, violence, poverty, and exclusion is in dire need of such approaches to planning in order to make the world more inclusive, resilient, and sustainable. As a proponent of this approach to planning, I do not believe in the planning, development, and creation of refugee camps where the value of human life is stripped down to a bare minimum. Instead, I believe in every person's right to stay in place and his/her right to move without being forced. In addition to ensuring the safety and security of the refugees, the camp should emerge as a space that promotes every opportunity for the refugees to grow and hope for a better future irrespective of his/her citizenship identity.

This research seeks to contribute to planning, humane urbanism, as well as critical refugee studies. Through her study of Vietnamese refugees, Yen Le Espiritu argues that this emergent field of study "refuses to locate the refugee as an object to be studied, a problem to be solved, or a legal classification to be dissected," and she critiques "the construction of the 'good refugee' who represents a solution to the nation-state's failure" (Le Espiritu, 2014, p.91, 104; Tang 2015, p.7). My study situates refugees at the intersection of geopolitical and socio-cultural constructs where refugees and their everyday experiences make them a successful negotiating actor rather than a helpless passive recipient of aids. This study also seeks to contribute to planning theory, especially in terms of planning and development of seemingly impermanent or transient places like refugee camps. In the planning and governance systems of the refugee camps, a privileging of instrumental rationality leads to a 'top-down' approach where the complexity of place, time, and users are elided. Instead, I propose a 'multiplanar' (Hillier, 2008) approach to the

planning of such spaces, where every dimension of a plan – people, place, time – are subject to continuous change.

In the following 'Chapter 2: Background', I historicize and analyze the Rohingya refugee crisis in the context of the world refugee scenario and the emergence of the conception and planning of refugee camps. In 'Chapter 3: Literature Review,' I analyze a broad and diverse range of literature to understand the scopes and challenges for resilient planning and governance of refugee camps in the context of impermanence and adhocracy. 'Chapter 4: Rohingya Refugee Camp' describes the existing Rohingya refugee camp system, focusing on the built environment and the governance of the camp and the coping strategies of Rohingya refugees. Drawing primarily from data collected through interviews, 'Chapter 5: Emergence of Impermanence and Adhocracy' focuses on the planning philosophies and challenges in the Rohingya refugee camp that accentuate the assumption of impermanence in the Rohingya refugee camp. 'Chapter 6: Embracing the Challenges of Impermanence and Adhocracy' highlights everyday practices of refugees that provide opportunities for alternative planning solutions, and more broadly serve to blur the distinctions between impermanence and permanency. Finally, in my conclusion, I reiterate the need for reevaluating the planning paradigms that shape Rohingya refugee camps in order to provide the Rohingya refugees with opportunities to lead a dignified human life.

Chapter 2: Background

2.1. Forced Displacement- Worldwide Scenario

> Every minute in 2018, 25 people were forced to flee. By the end of the year 2018, 70.8 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide to avoid persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations – 25.9 million of them are refugees. One-third of the global refugee population i.e. 6.7 million people were hosted by the least developed countries. Nearly 4 out of 5 refugees lived in countries neighboring their countries of origin (UNHCR, 2019)
>
> What we are seeing in these figures is further confirmation of a longer-term rising trend in the number of people needing safety from war, conflict, and persecution" – Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissions for Refugees (UNHCR, 2019, p.4).

Every day, vulnerable communities in the world are becoming more vulnerable both socially, economically, and politically, and increasingly deprived of basic human rights. According to the World Bank, the refugee crisis becomes a development crisis when forcibly displaced communities take refuge in other least developed communities, leading to a need for longer-term social and economic solutions both for the displaced and for the host communities (The World Bank, n.d.). However, the rights, services, and assistance provided to forcibly displaced people differ depending on their status and type of forced displacement. Distinctions are often made between conflict-induced and disaster-induced displacement, but the lines between these two types often become blurred since conflicts can erupt because of disputes over natural resources, or disasters can be triggered by human activities like landslides (Migration Data Portal, n.d.).

The United Nations (UN) categorizes forcibly displaced population in the following ways (United Nations, n.d.):

Refugees: A refugee, according to the 1951 Convention, "is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion" (UNHCR, n.d.).

Asylum Seekers: "An asylum seeker is an individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum seeker" (Amnesty International, 2019).

Internally Displaced Persons: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border" (UNHCR, n.d.).

Stateless Persons: A stateless person is "a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law" (UNHCR, n.d.). "Statelessness situations are usually caused by discrimination against certain groups. Their lack of identification — a citizenship certificate — can exclude them from access to important government services, including health care, education, or employment" (United Nations, n.d.).

Returnees: "Returnees are former refugees who return to their own countries or regions of origin after time in exile. Returnees need continuous support and reintegration assistance to ensure that they can rebuild their lives at home" (United Nations, n.d.).

2.2. GUIDELINES FOR REFUGEE RIGHTS

The rights of refugees are protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention and are administered by UNHCR (United Nations High Commissions on Refugees). UNHCR was formed in 1951 by the General Assembly of the United Nations to manage the displaced persons affected by World War II and was specifically limited to persons fleeing events occurring before 1 January 1951 and within Europe. Later through an amendment known as the '1967 Protocol', the geographic and temporal limits of the 1951 Convention were eliminated and the applicability of the convention as a 'status and right-based instrument' became universal. The fundamental principles of the convention notably include non-discrimination, non-penalization, and non-refoulment. Although 'non-discrimination' is one of the founding principles of the Convention, the convention does not apply universally for all refugees. Those who have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity, have committed serious non-political crimes, or are guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, are not protected by the Convention. Some classes of refugees are protected under other UN agencies, such as Palestine refugees protected by the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Work Agency), and refugees who have a status equivalent to nationals in their country of asylum are not protected by the 1951 Convention (United Nations, n.d.).

Under the commitment of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, refugees are granted basic rights such as access to courts, to primary education, to work, and to the provision for documentation including a refugee travel document in passport form. The principle of non-refoulment provides further security to refugees, stating that 'no one shall expel or return a refugee against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or freedom' (United Nations, n.d.). The Convention

and the Protocol also delineate roles for UNHCR to play along with directions for States to cooperate with the UNHCR to exercise its functions. UNHCR thus serves as the 'guardian' of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and promotes international instruments for the protection of the refugees and supervising their application. UNHCR exercises its supervisory role in a number of ways, including by developing standards, interpreting standards, and applying them (United Nations, n.d.).

2.3. REFUGEE CAMPS

Refugees are perceived through the framework of a 'problem-solving discourse'; that is, an anomaly that needs a solution (Nyers, 1998; Turner, 2016). Also, by framing refugees as a 'product' of unique or exceptional situations like war and natural disasters, refugee situations are 'coined in the language of emergencies,' and the humanitarian responses to these are similarly viewed as 'emergency measures' (Turner, 2016). Within this realm of emergency measures falls the idea of the 'refugee camp'.

According to the UNHCR definition, "Refugee camps are temporary facilities built to provide immediate protection and assistance to people who have been forced to flee due to conflict, violence or persecution. While camps are not intended to provide permanent sustainable solutions, they offer a safe haven for refugees where they receive medical treatment, food, shelter, and other basic services during emergencies" (USA for UNHCR, n.d.). Also as a safe humanitarian space, refugee camp includes security through a safe distance from the border no more than a day's walk where possible, safe geographical features including easily accessible water supplies, stable grounds, shaded areas, waste management capabilities, and accessibility so that supplies can reach the camp through big

vehicles (USA for UNHCR, n.d.). Refugee camps have unique spatiality and temporality: “Just as they are lodged spatially between the open and the closed, camps exist between the temporary and the permanent. From the outset, camps are understood as having a limited, although sometimes indeterminate, duration” (Hailey, 2009, p.4).

While refugee camps have become a containing place for a large number of refugees around the world, it is not an ultimate solution for the crisis. Even as a first responder to the refugee crisis, UNHCR does not advocate for the creation of camps. However, they provide standardized guidelines and mechanisms to ensure the delivery of services and facilities to refugees in camps or camp-like scenarios. The guidelines are available from the micro-scale shelter planning level to the macro-scale master plan level. For example, the shelter level guidelines from UNHCR include standards depicted in ‘The Sphere Handbook’, provide ‘Camp Planning Standards’ for the development of camps as part of a response to refugee influxes, and offer a ‘Master Plan Approach to Settlement Planning Guideline’ to keep the development of refugee camps in line with national development plans.

2.4. ROHINGYA: FROM STATELESSNESS TO REFUGEES

Rohingyas are an ethnic Muslim minority group mainly residing in the northern Rakhine state of Myanmar. Most Muslims in the Rakhine state claim ‘Rohingya’ as their ethnicity, while the majority population in Myanmar see the term Rohingya not as a representation of ethnical identity or cultural practices but “a gambit by a mixed-origin migrant group for greater political rights by claiming indigeneity under Mynamar law and through that to claim territory and self-governance” (Ware & Laoutides, 2018, p.16). The

Myanmar government officially recognized 135 ethnic groups indigenous to Myanmar through its Union Citizenship Act in 1945 but excluded the Rohingyas, even though they have a history of living in Rakhine state for the last 200 years (Qadir & Gardezi, 2019). In the Myanmar Census of 2014, an estimated 1 million people self-identified as Rohingya were living in three townships situated along the border of Bangladesh (Figure 1), making up 31% of the state's population. However, the Census classified them as 'not numerated' and identified the Muslims in the northern Rakhine state as 'Bengali' instead of 'Rohingya' (Leider, 2018; Blomquist & Cincotta2016; Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018). Referring to the Rohingya population as 'Bengalis' underscores the perception of Rohingya as outsiders and illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and reflects the Myanmar Government's attempt to root the Rohingya out of their home in Myanmar (Mohdin, 2017; Ware & Laoutides, 2018).



Figure 1: Concentration of major Ethnic groups in Myanmar, Source: Al-Jazeera

Historians document the presence of the Rohingyas in an independent kingdom in Arakan, now known as Rakhine state from the 8th century, and their presence is corroborated by ancient mosques and coins and the use of Islamic titles by Arakan rulers (Qadir & Gardezi, 2019; Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018). When Myanmar was under British rule from 1824-1948 and was known as Burma, Rohingyas served as government officials and received ration cards by the British Companies[1]. During British rule, there was a significant

[1] The British made Burma a province of India in 1886. The governance of all the Indian provinces were under the control of the British Empire and several British Companies monolopized trades, economy and infrastructures in Burma. For example, Irrawaddy Flotilla Company (IFC) was a passenger and cargo ferry company, which operated services on the Irrawaddy River in Burma. While British Companies held authoritative powers, they recruited local Burmese population as civil servants to carry out day-to-day administrative operations.

migration of laborers from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to then Burma. Since all those countries were under British colonial rule and Burma was administered as a province under India, such migrations were considered internal. However, after independence, the Myanmar government considered the migration that took place during British rule as illegal, and it is on this basis that they refuse citizenship to the majority of the Rohingya (Blakemore, 2019). For three years from 1942-1945 during British rule, Burma's Arakan Division (present-day Rakhine State, and especially the Buddhist areas) were under the control of Japan, and in 1945 Britain liberated Burma from Japanese occupation with the support of Burmese nationalists and Rohingya fighters. The North Arakan Muslim leaders were requesting political autonomy in return for the assistance they provided, but the British did not fulfill their promise and instead excluded the Rohingyas from civil service positions and banned them from participating in political activities. Thus after gaining independence from British rule, the majority Burmese population resented the politically vocal Muslim communities (Al-Mahmood, 2016; Leider, 2018).

In 1954, Burma's first Prime Minister U Nu acknowledged the presence of the ethnic Rohingya community in the Arakan State, and in 1959 the first President of Burma Sao Shwe Thaike claimed that the 'Muslims of Arakan' certainly belong to the indigenous races of Burma. Rohingya were issued citizenship/ID cards and were granted the right to vote, and were allowed to work in the civil services. In the 1960s, the Official Burma Broadcasting Service (BBS) streamed a radio program in the Rohingya language three times a week as part of its minority language programming, and the term 'Rohingya' was used in journals and textbooks in schools until the late 1970s (Macmanus, Green, & De la Cour Venning, 2015; Buchanon, 2016; Smith, n.d.; Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018).

The Rohingya started to face state-sponsored persecution in 1962 when General Ne Win and his Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) seized power, eliminated the parliamentary system, and placed Myanmar under military rule. The junta conducted 'Operation Nagamin (Operation King Dragon)' in 1977-1978 aimed at registering citizens and screening minorities and foreigners, and as a result, the Rohingya people lost their official documentation. The operation employed the ruthless 'four cuts' counter-insurgency strategy (cut rebel access to foods, funds, intelligence, and recruits) (Ware & Laoutides, 2018). The Burmese military was also accused of human rights abuses including rape, destruction of houses and villages and mass arrests during this operation, and around 200,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh to avoid the persecution (Buchanon, 2016; Ullah, 2016; Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018; Blakemore, 2019). In 1982, General Ne Win's government passed the Burmese Citizenship Law, which identified three levels of citizenship. To achieve naturalized citizenship, one's family had to be living in Myanmar before 1948 and had to be familiar with at least one of the local dialects. The law also stated that people who migrated to then-Burma during the British colonial era were considered illegal immigrants and identified as 'resident foreigners.' Thus under the Citizenship Law, Rohingya people were stripped of their citizenship due to lack of adequate documentation and rendered stateless.

Another targeted attempt against Rohingyas was 'Operation Phi Thaya (Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation)' in 1991. The operation reached its height when routine oppression turned to concerted brutality, with forced labor, land confiscations, destructions of mosques, rapes, and summary execution. This led to a massive exodus of 250,000 people in Bangladesh in the early 1990s. The manhunts and massacres were promoted with poetic, fanciful, warlike names—Dragon King, Clean and Beautiful Nation---as actions that

‘bestow glory on those who perpetrate them’ (Habiburahman & Ansel, 2019; Ullah, 2016; Ware & Laoutides, 2018). With the help of UNHCR and other agencies, the Rohingya people were sheltered in the southeastern border region of Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. Bangladesh was not a signatory of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, and the country was reluctant to promote the social integration of those Rohingya refugees with the local community and decided to repatriate the refugees back to Myanmar in 1992. The process of repatriation started in May 1993 after a UN survey showed that 30% of Rohingya refugees were willing to return. By 1997, the Bangladeshi government had managed to push almost 230,000 Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar (Leider, 2018; Parnini, 2013; Qadir & Gardezi, 2019).

Throughout the 1990s, NaSaKa, a mixed unit of the police, intelligence, and customs officers, advanced policies that created increasing hardship for the Rohingya, reducing freedom of movement, introducing restrictions on marriage and birth registration, and obstructing religious practices. Moreover, with a poverty rate of 78% compared to the 37.5% national average, Rakhine State is the least developed state in Myanmar. Widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and lack of employment opportunity exacerbated the cleavage between Buddhist and Muslim Rohingya, which at times resulted in conflict (Albert & Maizland, 2020). Two waves of violence took place between Rohingya Muslims and majority Buddhists in Rakhine State in 2012. Stokke, Vakulchuk & Overland (n.d.) characterized this as communal violence between Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya groups, and military violence perpetrated by the military against Rohingya groups. A state of emergency followed and placed the region under military administration, but “communal antagonisms and violence rooted in both the local political economy of underdevelopment” and “the antagonistic politicization of ethnic and religious identities at the local and

national level" led to the continuation of the brutality (Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018, p. 554). A report (2015) by ISCI (International State Crime Initiative) analyzed the persecution of the Rohingya against the six stages of genocide outlined by Daniel Feierstein: stigmatization (and dehumanization), harassment, violence and terror, isolation and segregation, systematic weakening, mass annihilation and symbolic enactment involving the removal of the victim group from the collective history. The analysis concluded that the Rohingya in Myanmar suffered the first four of six stages of genocide and that these genocidal processes had been orchestrated at the highest level of the national and the local Rakhine government: "the State's persistent and intensified 'othering' of the Rohingya as outsiders, illegal Bengali immigrants, and potential terrorists has given a green light to Rakhine nationalists and Islamophobic monks to orchestrate invidious campaigns of race and religious hatred reminiscent of those witnessed in Germany in the 1930s and Rwanda in the early 1990s" (Macmanus, Green, & De la Cour Venning, 2015, p.99).

In retaliation against the brutalities, in August 2017 the Rohingya militant group ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) attacked 30 police stations and an army base in Rakhine State, killing 12 Myanmar security forces. An atrocious response to that attack followed where security forces burned down scores of Rohingya villages, murdered thousands of civilians, and launched a campaign of rapes against Rohingya women and girls, leading more than 400,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh according to a UN estimate. Amnesty International said that Myanmar is trapping the Rohingyas who are left there in a 'dehumanizing apartheid regime' (Barany, 2019; Qadir & Gardezi, 2019; Blakemore, 2019).

2.5. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSES TO THE ROHINGYA REFUGEE CRISIS

As a reaction to the recent 2017 exodus of Rohingya refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for human rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, described Myanmar's treatment of its Muslim Rohingya minority to be 'a textbook example of ethnic cleansing' and denounced the 'brutal security operation' against the Rohingya in the Rakhine state (Safi, 2017). Human rights groups and UN leaders suspect acts of genocide and human rights violation have taken place and reports by the UN fact-finding mission have corroborated the fact:

> The authorities of Myanmar, both military and civilian, have failed to condemn, investigate, or punish perpetrators of gross human rights violations. Rather, they have categorically denied violations, created legal obstacles to accountability, destroyed evidence of crimes, and actively nurtured and perpetuated a climate of impunity that has emboldened perpetrators. These acts are in violation of the international human rights norms and standards….. (OHCHR, 2018, p.409).

The head of the fact-finding mission addressed the UN General Assembly on September 2019 and added that

> ……the cycle of impunity enables, and indeed fuels, this reprehensible conduct on the part of the security forces……the treatment of some 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State is largely unchanged. Their situation has worsened, as they endure another year subjected to discrimination, segregation, movement restrictions, and insecurity, without adequate access to livelihoods, land, basic services, including education and health care, or justice for past crimes committed against them by the Tatmadaw…. (OHCHR, 2019).

The Myanmar military was also included for the first time in the UN annual list of parties that have committed sexual violence in armed conflict, and the UN still keeps Myanmar on the list of countries that use and recruit child soldiers. Along with UN and human rights groups, international communities and Muslim countries, in particular,

criticized the Myanmar Government's role and reaction to the 2017 Rohingya crisis. The United Kingdom became the first European country to denounce military persecution, and many other European countries also joined later. The United States reimposed trade and monetary sanctions on Myanmar in 2017, which had been lifted in December 2016 following Myanmar's apparent progress in improving the human rights situation in the country. The US State Department also downgraded Myanmar in 2018 Trafficking in Persons report[2] to its lowest tier, tier 3 (Qadir & Gardezi, 2019; Ullah & Chattoraj, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2018).

In a recent international response in November 2019, the West African nation of Gambia, on behalf of the 57-nation Organization of Islamic Cooperation, filed a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice (ICC) against Myanmar accusing the country of violating the UN Genocide Convention. The Court unanimously ruled in January 2020 that Myanmar "must enact emergency measures to protect Rohingya from violence and preserve evidence of possible genocide." Separately, the ICC started an investigation into alleged atrocities in November 2019 (Heijmans, 2020; Albert & Maizland, 2020).

Myanmar's de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel laureate for human rights security and a champion of the democratic system, has been criticized for her dubious role throughout the crisis. As a reaction to the international media covering Rohingya crisis, Suu Kyi mentioned in September 2017 that her Government had "already started

2 The *2018 Trafficking in Persons Report* is an essential US State Department tool used to shed light on the darkness where modern slavery thrives and to highlight specific steps each government can take to protect victims of human trafficking, prevent trafficking crimes, and prosecute traffickers in the United States and around the world. Countries whose governments do not fully meet the Trafficking Victims Protection Act's (TVPA) minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so are placed in Tier 3.

defending all the people in Rakhine in the best way possible" (Ellis-Peterson, 2018), but later she denied access and cooperation with the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights for the remainder of her term. Her approach of denial and persecution of Rohingya corroborates the fact that the genocide was state-sponsored, and the government's role in this conflict was rather 'escalatory than conciliatory' (Ellis-Peterson, 2018; Qadir and Gardezi, 2018; Albert & Maizland, 2020).

From a regional perspective, China and India, two countries that share borders with Myanmar, gave a cold shoulder to the Rohingya crisis because of their vested interests in the country. Taking a stance against complicating, expanding, or internationalizing the Rohingya issue, China keeps shielding Myanmar from 'accountability and scrutiny, obstructing international action and weakening UN measures' (Reuters, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2019). While other countries have cut foreign funding to Myanmar, China expanded the investment in the country through the development project known as the 'China-Myanmar Economic Corridor'. India also announced the deportation of Rohingya people who fled to India for asylum, and also failed to take a regional leadership position in solving the Rohingya crisis between two nations—Myanmar and Bangladesh—with whom India had entered into many bilateral agreements. The three countries also share membership in different regional cooperative organizations such as BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) (Qadir & Gardezi, 2019; Yhome, 2018).

2.6. RESPONSE OF BANGLADESH TO THE ROHINGYA CRISIS

Bangladesh shares a 271-kilometer long border with Myanmar which cuts through hills, forest, rivers, canals, and sea. The porosity of the border makes it difficult to navigate the political, economic, and security aspects of the bilateral relationship between two countries (Bashar, 2012; Parnini, 2013). Although Myanmar shares borders with four other countries, the number of Rohingya refugees entering Bangladesh has always been high compared to other countries because of cultural and religious affinities; also, the Rohingya language 'Ruáingga' is similar to the Chittagongian dialect used in south-eastern Bangladesh (Ullah, 2011). However, Bangladesh is a developing country burdened with recurring natural disasters, a high rate of population increase, and resultant congestion, and Rohingya refugees were always perceived as an economic burden on this resource-poor country. Rohingyas have been blamed for resisting Bangladesh and Myanmar authorities and for organized crime, including smuggling of arms and weapons and drug trafficking in border regions (Bashar, 2012.; Parnini, Othman & Ghazali, 2013; Ullah, 2011). Also, the deplorable living condition in the camps make the Rohingya refugees easy targets for recruitment by Islamic fundamentalists or criminal groups and makes them vulnerable to non-traditional and transnational security threats, maritime piracy, deadly violence, crimes, illegal human trafficking, and sex trafficking (Parnini et al., 2013).

Before the 2017 exodus, Rohingya refugees fled to Bangladesh to avoid state-sponsored persecution and violence in Myanmar in several episodes. Following the 1978 exodus, the Bangladesh Government set up 20 refugee camps for them. However, after the repatriation of most refugees by 1997, all camps were closed except two: Nayapara camp in Teknaf and Kutupalong camp in Ukhiya, with around 22,000 refugees. Some of the refugees left the camps, and, given the similarities of language and cultural familiarity,

were able to obtain jobs throughout the Chittagong district (Ullah, 2011). The initial response of Bangladesh to the most recent Rohingya refugee crisis was commended by the International community. While other countries were building walls, pushing asylum seekers back at the borders and deporting people without adequately considering their protection claims, Bangladesh welcomed 900,000 Rohingya refugees who escaped from religion and ethnicity-based persecution in Myanmar in 2017. Today, the Kutupalong-Balukhali extension camp, sometimes referred to as a 'mega-camp' is the largest refugee camp in the world (Human Rights Watch, 2018). However, as Bangladesh is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the Rohingya refugees lack recognized refugee status and any rights associated with this status from the Bangladeshi government. All of the Rohingya refugees who have arrived Bangladesh after 2017 are designated as "Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals," making them vulnerable to "denial of freedom of movement, access to public services, education, and livelihoods, as well as to arrest and exploitation" (Human Rights Watch, 2018, p. 4).

As an overpopulated country with a weak infrastructural system, Bangladesh is eager to initiate the repatriation process of Rohingya refugees. A tentative agreement was signed between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 2017 to repatriate the refugees in a 'voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable' manner. Following that agreement, however, two repatriation attempts in 2018 failed in the face of protests by Rohingya refugees and the lack of willingness on the part of the Myanmar government to take the Rohingya refugees back. The Myanmar government had already bulldozed the burnt villages of Rohingyas and started rebuilding 'common villages' where homes would be occupied by Rakhine, Chin, Bamar, and Hindu people from other parts of the country. Upon repatriation, the returnee Rohingyas would be kept in dismal transit centers, or, as Human Right Watch

calls them, ‘internment camp/open-air prisons’. As long as Myanmar cannot provide a sustainable environment to ensure the safety, security, dignity and citizenship rights of the Rohingyas, the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees in Myanmar will remain uncertain (Beech & Nang, 2018; Ellis-Petersen & Rahman, 2019; Goldberg, 2018; Taniparti, 2019; Uddin, 2018).

Meanwhile, to relieve the congestion in the disaster-prone mega camp areas in Cox’s Bazar, the Bangladesh government prepared to relocate 100,000 Rohingya refugees to the island of Bhasan Char (Figure 2). A Human Rights Watch reports revealed that this relocation proposal is not a sustainable solution for a host of reasons: “1) it is not sustainable for human habitation; 2) it could be seriously affected by rising sea levels and storm surges; 3) it likely would have very limited education and health services; 4) it would provide extremely limited opportunities for livelihoods or self-sufficiency; 5) it would unnecessarily isolate refugees; 6) the Bangladeshi government has made no commitment to allow refugees’ freedom of movement in and from Bhasan Char; 7) it is far from the Myanmar border, and 8) the refugees have not consented to move there” (Human Rights Watch, 2018, p.3).

Figure 2: Bhasan Char and Refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, source: Human Rights Watch, 2018.

After August 25, 2017, a total of 708, 985 Rohingya individuals and 151,277 households began arriving in Bangladesh, and by March 2020 total refugee population has reached 859,161. The demographic profile is comprised of 52% female and 48% male, with 54% children, and 4.3% of total individuals identified as having a special need (UNHCR, 2020). Although more than 50,000 shelters have been erected since the beginning of the crisis, over 75% of families have to share their shelters. With living space as low as 8 square meters per person, 93% of the population lives below the UNHCR emergency standard of 45 square meters per person. Over 23,000 people are at serious risk of landslides, living in 120 hectares of landslide-prone areas (United Nations, n.d.).

A case where 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given host country is defined as a 'protracted refugee situation' by UNHCR. According to UNHCR, "the situation of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in Bangladesh is classified as a protracted situation because the refugee population has exceeded 25,000 every year since 2006 although the vast majority of the current refugee population from Myanmar arrived there in 2017" (UNHCR, 2019). In light of other refugee crises elsewhere, it is evident that if the displacement period is over six-months, the refugees are highly likely to be in exile for years. Thus it is high time Bangladesh starts developing sustainable long-term solutions for the Rohingya refugees. In order to develop such a sustainable solution, it is necessary to understand the current planning approaches used in the Rohingya refugee camps and the overarching rationalities that drive these strategies.

Chapter 3: Literature Review

The conception of refugee crises as essentially temporary phenomena has led to the perception of refugee camps as transient settlements (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Hailey, 2009; Turner, 2016; Moore, 2017). However, research in planning and design has demonstrated the necessity of developing more sustainable solutions for refugee camps, both to foster the livability of refugee camps but also to mitigate challenges for host communities (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Martin, 2014; Moore, 2017; Dalal et al. 2018; Jahre et al. 2018). In this literature review, I analyze the politics around the exclusion of refugees and the conceptualization of impermanence of refugee camps, and the resultant governance structure and planning decisions in refugee camps. I focused primarily on literature that focuses on refugee issues; research that only examined IDP (Internally Displaced People) settlements was excluded.

3.1. THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION AND IMPERMANENCE

To understand how the conceptualization of impermanence has become a driving rationality behind refugee camp or settlement policies, we must first comprehend the meaning and social acceptance associated with the word ‘refugee’. According to the UNHCR report of 2019, around 68.5 million people are forcibly displaced from home worldwide and 25.4 million of them are refugees, the highest levels of displacement in record till now in the world. Two-thirds of all refugees come from just five countries: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia. Eighty-five percent of displaced people worldwide are hosted by developing countries that struggle with resource limitations (UNHCR, 2019).

UNHCR defines a refugee as “someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group” (USA for UNHCR, n.d.). The system of state and resource enclosures is deeply embedded in our culture and way of life and dominates our socio-political discourse (Jones, 2016). When a refugee leaves his homeland to escape violence, persecution, and poverty, not only is he at constant risk but also seen as a threat to the economic, cultural, and political development of the host country. Thus, refugees are seen as a ‘matter out of place’ that should be secluded to protect ‘the national order of things’ (Malkki, 1992). Taking a cue from Ahmed and Garland, Zembylas (2010) argued that a politics of fear produced through power relations and cultural scripts constructs immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers as ‘fearsome’ threats to the host nation’s very existence.

To understand how these ‘fearsome’ refugees and their positions in our social, political, and economic life are constructed and adjusted, the concept of ‘biopower,’ a term coined by Foucault and later expanded by Agamben may provide further insight. According to Foucault (1980, 2003, 2007), biopower is the mechanism through which corrective and disciplinary strategies (enforced within the state in the form of the prison, school, and hospital) are replaced by biopolitics who holds the power to regulate the life of the population. The state thus acts preventively to protect its populations’ well-being and does not hesitate to exclude people from other nations or harm them in this process (Zembylas, 2010). This politics of security, which creates a distinct divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’- where the former has right to live and flourish and the latter gets expendable, based on the different kinds of profiling – race, ethnicity,

nationality and so on, can be understood through Foucault's conception of 'biopolitics' (Zembylas, 2010). Expanding on Foucault's work, Agamben (1998) argues that biopolitics is not only a phenomenon of modern politics but has been practiced in Western society since early Greek civilization when biopolitics was reflected in Aristotle's idea of the separation between life in the 'polis' (the political life) and 'Zoe' (the biological life) or bare life. Agamben (2005) argues that biopolitics is embedded in a '*structure of exception*', whereby the life of the citizen (his political and social life) is construed as at risk. That is to say, through the simultaneous exclusions and inclusions of bare life, biopower exerts its ability to 'suspend itself in a state of exception and determine who lives and who dies' (Zembylas, 2010). Through the power of biopolitics, the refugee camps became "the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West… insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation*"* (Agamben 1998, p.171, 181). Drawing on Agamben (1998) and Owens (2009), Ramadan (2013) explains how refugee status thus gets constructed as a 'temporary' condition that can only lead to some form of normalization through achieving citizenship, either via naturalization or repatriation. Through their exclusion, refugees are "governed at the level of population in a permanent 'state of exclusion' outside the normal legal framework- the camp" (Owens, 2009, p. 568).

3.2. EXCEPTIONAL' GOVERNANCE AND PRODUCTION OF ADHOCRACY

Refugee camps hence appear as a means to contain the 'matter out of place'—the refugee camp encompasses both the symptom and the cure (Turner, 2016). Taking a cue from Agier and Agamben, Turner (2016) explains how the realms of refugee camps can be delineated by extraterritoriality, exception, and exclusion. Camps are extraterritorial when they are placed in a secluded area, they fall under the realm of exception as they are governed by different legal instruments than their surroundings, and by restricting their integration into host culture and society, they are subjected to social exclusion (Turner, 2016). However, in this space of exclusion emerges a 'humanitarian space' where the international community comes forward to consign a state of protection and relief for refugees in an 'enduring but ultimately temporary way' (Edkins, 2000; Elden, 2009; McQueen, 2005; Yamashita, 2004; Ramadan, 2013). The intersections of these two realms thus provide refugee camps a dual dimension of technology of 'care and control' (Malkki, 1992).

Given their duality, international aid agencies view refugee camps with skepticism. As UNHCR declares in their emergency handbook, "along with the wider humanitarian community, UNHCR does not advocate the creation of camps. It considers them to be temporary measures of last resort" (UNHCR, n.d., p.2). At the same time, the agency needs to secure authorization from representatives of the nation-state, and the role of camp administration is "usually assumed by national or local authorities. It involves the overall supervision of a camp response, including the security of the persons of concern" (UNHCR, n.d., p.2), who in most cases supports the exclusionary power structure of the refugee camp. Within this duality and among the presence of a diverse array of agencies –

national and international aid organizations, donors and governmental entities- rise a system of mismanagement which emerges in the form of a 'chaotic and improvisational *adhocracy*' (Dunn, 2016). Although governance in refugee camps is ostensibly premised on "seeing, counting, and managing", Dunn (2012) argues that it is more based on "guesswork, rules of thumb, and satisficing the needs of rational planning" (Dunn, 2012, p.2). Camp governance relies on 'rough-and-ready' ways of knowing to quickly work out improvised solutions, thus transforming bureaucracy into "adhocracy- a form of power that creates chaos and vulnerability as much as it creates order" (Dunn, 2012, p.2). Within this system, where everything is supposed to be temporary, transitional and where 'aid' and 'care' are distributed on an ad-hoc basis, refugees are kept in suspension: they do not know what the future holds or how to plan for it, and they do not know how to leverage the resources and services available to them. They are "stranded in the present, left in a situation that is forever temporary" (Dunn, 2016, p. 773).

3.3. POSSIBILITIES OF REFUGEE CAMP PLANNING IN ADHOCRACY

The idea of refugee camps as spaces of exception, exclusion, and impermanence shapes the physical and spatial planning approaches to address the refugee crisis. Camps are built as temporary means to address a presumably 'temporary' refugee crisis, and, following the Agambenian principle of providing a bare life for refugees in camps, many host governments ban the use of permanent building materials like concrete or burnt bricks, instead of using temporary materials in order to reproduce a sense of impermanence in the built environment (Dunn, 2016). While refugees are supposed to live in a host country for only a limited amount of time, because of political disagreements refugees remain in their host country for 17 years on average, according to the UNHCR (Sabie, 2017). Since camps

typically have a longer lifespan than they are intended to, recent research views camps as long-term settlements rather than a temporary holding facility and examines the possibilities are transforming camps into cities (Kennedy, 2005, Jahre et al, 2018; Radford, 2015). In most cases, however, host governments seek to limit any sense of permanency by locating transient settlements in environmentally hazardous and socially isolated places (Moore, 2017). According to Hailey (2009), host governments believe "camps are not intended to be sustainable settlements" (Hailey, 2009, p.325), instead exposing refugees to risky conditions which in turn leads them to become environmental refugees (Hailey, 2009; Corsellis and Vitale 2004). Thus, the privileging of impermanent solutions as a means of control may lead to a protracted or even worsening refugee situation.

Recent research has explored new approaches to refugee camp planning from the perspective of urban planning, suggesting that the socio-political realities call for context-responsive ways of durable spatial planning to provide adequate, dignified and sustainable measures for the development of refugee community (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, Dalal et al. 2018, Jahre et al. 2018). Other studies have sought to reimagine the traditional top-down nature of the refugee camps, how to improve shelter conditions and design with refugees' input in the design process, and the environmental implications of refugee camps (Ratnayake & Rameezdeen, 2008; Hagenlocher, Lang & Tiede, 2012; Ohlson and Melich, 2014; Anderson, 2016; Dabaieh & Alwall, 2018). Spatial planning approaches that recognize refugee settlements as a 'node' connected to the social-political realm of adjacent territories can be a useful concept for both short term planning and subsequent future interventions (Moore, 2017).

Another stream of literature has focused on how the operations and governance of aid organizations have transformed refugees from political to neoliberal subjects through the practice of 'resiliency humanitarianism', an approach that focuses on strategies of care, the exercise of knowledge expertise, and social and political practices which operate within and beyond refugee camps (Fassin, 2007; Agier, 2011; Gryzb, 2013; Ilcan, 2013). Within this paradigm of resiliency humanitarianism, neoliberal governance operates to "mobilize new forms of responsible subjects," privileging partnerships among different actors as a cost-effective way to manage refugees. Such partnership will facilitate the "sharing of knowledge and capacities and capacity-building among partners," fostering a "view of refugees as the objects and subjects of government, and the camp as an enduring living space or community" (Ilcan, 2009; Ilcan 2013; Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015, p.336,338). Such partnerships with refugees to operate and manage the camps, however, evades the notion of life in refugee camps as temporary and transitional (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015).

Following the notions of resiliency humanitarianism, other research has focused on the spatial dimension of camps and advocated for the integration of refugee community with the host community through the "interconnectedness between activities, actors and resources" (Adjahossou,2015; Granovetter, 1985; Hakansson et. al, 2009; Jahre et. al, 2018, p.326). Recent studies have also shown that operating within a resiliency humanitarianism paradigm, refugee camps can become engines of economic growth where resources and services are shared between host communities and refugees (Adjahossou, 2015; Gibson, 2016, Jahre et al, 2018, Radford, 2015). Through this paradigm of resiliency humanitarianism, refugees are viewed as neoliberal residents of the camp who are resilient in nature and capable of participating in the governance of the day-to-day running of the camp, thus mitigating the feeling of disempowerment among refugees (Ilcan & Rygiel,

2015). However, the empowerment provided through this approach represents a depoliticization of the refugee crisis, and resiliency becomes a 'methodology of power' that encourages refugees to adapt to the prevailing system rather than demanding a structural change that ensures their needs and rights as both human beings and citizens (Welsh, 2014; Ilcan and Rygiel, 2015). Thus, Hilhorst (2018) concludes that the resilience paradigm "consists of a set of ill-tested assumptions that seem to reduce the multiplicity of social reality to a singular discourse" (Hilhorst, 2018, p.10).

However, the Agambenian view and resiliency humanitarianism are not mutually exclusive. They both come into play and shape the planning and governance of a refugee camp in various degrees. Focusing on the Agambenian view of the refugee camp, most planning literature has examined the impact of political systems and external actor relationships on planning decisions in refugee camps. Less research has explored the human side of refugee camps, instead of viewing refugees as passive recipients of aid. However, refugee camps must be understood through the interactions of all of the actors that shape their spatial and social character, including national governments, aid agencies, host communities, and also the refugees themselves, whose side of the story—their struggle and adaptive mechanisms as well as their everyday politics—are often excluded. There is still a lack of research which focuses on the refugees as an actor in the planning field whose everyday practices shape the planning and management of the camps. Given the importance of the everyday practices of refugees to understanding the social and spatial production of refugee camps, I turn to Simone's (2008) perspective of emergency democracy.

Simone uses this concept to explain the everyday economic and political life of citizens in African cities, which is characterized by "the potential resourcefulness of relatively invisible architectures of sometimes highly dispersed collaboration among actors who may or may not know they are indeed collaborating" (Simone, 2008, p. 14). The idea of emergency democracy can also be read together with Simone's conceptualization of 'people as infrastructure'. Here he refers to forms of "economic collaboration among residents seemingly marginalized from and immiserated by urban life……the kinds of provision and articulation are viewed as making the city productive, reproducing it, and positioning its residents, territories, and resources in specific ensembles where the energies of individuals can be most efficiently deployed and accounted for" (Simone, 2004, p. 407).

Though Simone developed these concepts to understand informal practices in African cities, I suggest these are also applicable to the situation in refugee camps where, despite restrictive planning mandates, the refugees do not limit themselves to their role as neoliberal, responsible citizens. Instead, they establish themselves as actors of emergency democracy who negotiate with other actors while developing networks of informal connections (Simone, 2004; Simone, 2008). Refugees thus develop a strong social infrastructure system in the camp, allowing them to exert influence on planning processes. Through their social infrastructures, they challenge the discourse of impermanence through "webs of interaction that open up new uses for ordinary objects and infrastructure, thus altering what they mean and what their value might be" (Simone, 2008, p.14).

Through his study of the Palestinian refugee camps, Ramadan (2013) also argued that the refugee camp is much more than "a void of law and political life," instead he viewed refugee camps as a production of the "relations between and the practices of people-

as individuals, families, institutions, and organizations" (Ramadan, 2013, p. 70). Examining the actors involved in shaping the geopolitical landscapes of camps but also those who live in this landscape, Ramadan (2012) argues that temporality is produced in camps through two registers: the external formal juridical–political order of states, international agencies and international law, and the internal cultural, social and political order of the camp-society. This internal order is not always manifested in the built environment, nor can it always be measured in terms of time. In some cases of the protracted refugee situation, camps lose their temporary character through host community and refugee interaction and informal integration, and the 'campscape' blurs with the adjacent city boundary, such as in the case of Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut (Martin, 2015). In other cases, the lack of integration with the host community prolongs the temporality of the refugee camps in every sense (Anderson, 2016). Since every refugee crisis is unique in nature and scale, context-based understanding of refugee camps, including the relationships among all the actors and their everyday practices, is necessary to outline prudent policy and planning solutions.

Chapter 4: Rohingya Refugee Camp

4.1. THE CAMPSCAPE IN COX'S BAZAR

Rohingya refugees are living in different settlements in two Upazilas[3] - Ukhiya and Teknaf in Cox's Bazar District in Bangladesh. The settlements are divided into 34 camp areas covering 9.83 square mile area in total. Most of the 26 camps are located in the Palongkhali union[4] in Ukhiya. Two camps are designated as registered camps by the RRRC Office (Office of Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner) of Bangladesh — Kutupalong (KTP) RC and Nayapara (NYP) RC—where Rohingya refugees who entered Bangladesh before the 2017 influx are living now. Whereas the refugee settlements in Ukhiya are restricted within distinct spatial camp boundaries, refugee settlements in Teknaf are not confined by a spatial boundary and are located in close proximity to host community settlements (Figure 3).

[3] Upazilas are the second lowest tier of regional administration in Bangladesh. They function as sub-units of "districts." Bangladesh is divided into 8 Divisions, 64 Districts, 492 Upazilas (sub-districts). The Upazilas are further sub-divided into 4554 rural union councils and 323 town councils.

[4] Union councils or unions are the smallest rural administrative and local government units in Bangladesh. There are 4554 unions in Bangladesh. Each Union is made up of nine Wards. Usually one village is designated as a ward.



Figure 3: Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, source: UNHCR

Around 1000 acres of forest were cleared and many hills leveled to build the refugee camps (Figure 4). The camps are situated alongside the Teknaf Wildlife Sanctuary and the camps in Kutupalong and Ukhiya are built on a vital elephant migration path, making them vulnerable to frequent elephant attacks (Daly, 2018). Most of the camps are built on leveled hills, which make them vulnerable to different disasters including landslides and monsoon flooding, while a few of them are built without leveling hills, using building techniques that have lower environmental impacts.

Figure 4: Typical view of the Rohingya refugee camp, source: Louis Parkinson

At first glance, the landscape of the Rohingya refugee camp is like a congested slum with impermanent shelters and little patches of green here and there. The temperature in the camp area was three degrees Celsius higher on average than in the nearby suburban area during the dry season in April 2019, and dust from the dry clays in the hills made it difficult to breathe (Burak, pers. int., 2019). When I visited the refugee camp in June, it was raining for the first time after a long dry summer season. While the temperature was comfortable, refugees were busy protecting their shelters from the inclement weather.

I found different types of shelters in different camps during my site visit in July 2019. At the beginning of the emergency period, UNHCR provided some Refugee Housing Units (RHU) (Figure 5) to the camps. RHU units are modular, foldable shelter units with lightweight steel frames and semi-hard and opaque plastic panels as roofs and walls. Although this unit has proved to be a successful emergency shelter unit in refugee settlements in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, the envelope material is not suitable for the subtropical monsoon climate in Bangladesh. The internal temperature of the RHU units is higher than the outdoor temperature, making them uncomfortable for housing. In Cox's Bazar, these RHU units are used as storage spaces.

Figure 5: RHU Units provided by UNHCR, source: Author.

When the refugees first came to Bangladesh in 2017, UNHCR and IOM gave each household a material kit that included 6-8 bamboo poles, tarpaulin, and ropes. Each household was given the same amount of materials irrespective of the household size and was expected to build their shelters themselves. Since people were arriving by the thousands every day, it was not possible for aid organizations to build shelters for the refugees. By the time the influx of refugees has abated, monsoon season arrived and the makeshift shelters built by refugees became vulnerable. Faced with the need for more durable shelters, aid organizations started planning shelters that met the international standard of minimum shelter requirements: at least 2m tall shelters with 3.5 square meters of shelter per person in the camp. Another round of materials was distributed—treated

bamboo, concrete and metal footing, additional poling and ropes—and refugees were provided with training to make these so-called ‘midterm’ shelters more durable. By this time, the camp had been expanded and also become very densely populated, making it difficult to reach every household to distribute these materials. Since there was not enough space to rebuild every shelter according to international standards, the midterm shelters were restricted to the most newly developed area of the camp (Manita, pers. int., 2019). As a result, in the camps there is a mixture of shelters available, some still in the form of emergency shelters while others are midterm.

The shelters are often divided into two spaces, one for living and one for a kitchen. In the initial phase of the settlement, refugees cut trees from surrounding hills to use as fuel. Later each household was given a stove, and each month they receive a cylinder of LPG gas to use as fuel. Other infrastructure services, such as toilets and hand pumps to obtain drinking water, are housed in a communal location. In some camps, 15-20 households have to share a toilet, bathing space, and a hand pump.

In the extended camp areas, UNHCR and IOM have started building two camps: Camp 4 Extension and Camp 20 Extension. Unlike the early emergency camps, the site planning for these camps was completed before construction, and the camps are built following the international standards outlined in the *Sphere Handbook* and the *UNHCR Camp Planning Standard*. The top of the hills have been flattened to build those camps, and refugees are allowed to build the shelters by themselves far enough apart to allow for minimum ventilation. The shelter size is usually 10 ft by 15 ft. In these midterm shelters, the construction technique and materials are better than in the impromptu ones, and stronger building materials like bamboo are used to stabilize the roof. Refugees are also

trained on how to build resilient shelters with the impermanent materials available to them. In these newer camps, every four households share a toilet and a bathing space, and there is room around their shelters to grow vegetables. These camps are also provided with waste disposal bins and firefighting equipment. Because of the more ample open spaces between the shelters, if all the camps were built this way, the total refugee settlement area would be four times bigger than the present area.

In contrast to the camps in the Ukhiya area, the camps in Teknaf are located close to the host communities. The architecture in those camps is similar to the host community, and it is difficult to distinguish refugee settlements from the host communities as the spatial boundaries between them are often blurred. One of these is Camp 21, locally known as Omani Camp because it is funded by the Sultanate of Oman. The local host community builds their houses on stilts and the refugee shelters are also built that way (Figure 6). These stilt structures allow shelters to be built without leveling hilly areas, leading to less environmental destruction than in the case of Ukhiya. In Omani Camp, infrastructure services such as toilets, bathing spaces, and drinking water are communal, with about 6-7 households sharing facilities.

Figure 6: (top) Integrated refugee settlements with the host community at Omani camp, (bottom) A typical shelter at Omani Camp, source: Author

While the shelter types vary among different camps, the different infrastructural systems—roads, bridges, drainage structures, and waste management systems—are relatively similar. Apart from the main roads, all other secondary and tertiary roads are built of mud and sand. Thus during monsoon season, they become slippery and at times unusable. The main roads that connect the refugee camp area with the host communities are paved with bricks instead of asphalt, which is typically used in Bangladesh. As a result, during monsoon season, these brick roads also become risky and require reconstruction several times. The central drainage and sewer system are of concrete material in some cases, but all the sewer systems in individual shelters are constructed with bamboo, ropes, and bags of sand/cement, and the bridges across the canals connecting different camps are also made of bamboo. Building sewer and drainage systems with permanent materials like concrete and brick would limit the possibility of preplanning the whole camp (Manita, pers. int., 2019). Other than in the newly designed Camp 4 Extension and Camp 20 Extension, no camps have a central sewer system. The toilets are pit latrines with bamboo fences or corrugated sheets as envelopes, and the fecal sludge is removed from the pit and brought to the treatment plant through a mobile transportation system using 'vacuum trucks'. Wastewater from the kitchen and bathing spaces flows to the main drainage. In a few camps, including the registered camp and the newly designed Camps 4 and 20, there are dustbins of different colors to dispose of organic and inorganic wastes, but those are not enough in number and are not properly utilized. In other camps, there are landfill areas where refugees dump their household waste.

The communal structures stand out in the camp landscape (Figure 7.1-7.4). These include learning centers, child-friendly spaces, women-friendly spaces, community spaces, mosques, madrassas, and roadside small tea shops, but the number, size, and shape of

different communal structures vary from camp to camp. While the shelters in the refugee camps are impermanent in nature, these communal structures are more of a semi-permanent character. Uses of bricks and concrete as building materials are allowed to a certain extent in those structures. Other built structures in the camp include hospitals, health camps, site management office, military base structure, structures for elephant watch, and storage units.



Figure 7.1- 7.4: (top to bottom) A mosque, a Learning Center, a tea stall, a Women Friendly Space, source: Author.

4.2. THE PLANNED CAMP IN BHASAN CHAR

To tackle the congestion issue in Cox's Bazar, the Government of Bangladesh has spent $280 million to relocate 100,000 refugees to an island named Bhasan Char (Figure 8). It is an isolated island far from the mainland, and there is a debate going on whether this island is inhabitable or not. The entire island is supposed to be encircled by a 30-mile long and 20-foot high embankment as a flood defense mechanism. Although this initiative is also termed a 'temporary arrangement' (Paul, Baldwin & Marshall, 2018), the built landscape there is completely different from that of Cox's Bazar. The shelters are made of hollow bricks and corrugated metal and are standing on three feet high pylons to protect against flooding in the monsoon season. Each shelter cluster consists of 16 living units (12 ft X 14 ft) to house 16 families and includes a shared kitchen, toilets, and bathing facilities at two ends. The shelters are clustered around a central pond or field, and each cluster has a 4-story communal structure that will be used as a hospital, community center, school, or cyclone shelter (Figure 9). In this arrangement, every refugee will have an average of 3.6 square meters of living area, which meets the UNHCR's emergency minimum standard (Reuters Graphics, 2017*)*. Two-thirds of the island has been preserved in its natural state, which would allow refugees to pursue fishing and farming activities (Tashin, pers. int., 2019).

Figure 8: (top) Satellite image of Bhasan Char in April 2020, source: Google Earth; (bottom) A closer perspective of a cluster of Bhasan Char relocation project, source: DW.com.



Figure 9: Construction detail of Bhasan Char Project, source: Mukta Dinwiddlie Maclaren Architects.

4.3. THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

The response to the Rohingya refugee crisis can be analyzed on three levels: national (Dhaka-based), local/district (Cox's Bazar district base), and camp level. On the national level, the Government of Bangladesh established a National Strategy on Myanmar Refugees and Undocumented Myanmar Nationals in 2013, followed by a National Task Force (NTF) which provided oversight and strategic guidance. The government of

Bangladesh also established the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC)'s Office in 1992 under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR) to oversee the relief and repatriation initiatives for Rohingya refugees who fled from Myanmar to Bangladesh in the years 1991-1992 to escape political, social, economic and ethnic persecution. RRRC is the topmost decisive authority in Bangladesh, tasked with operationalizing the coordination of the refugee response at the District level.

To assist the Government of Bangladesh in responding effectively to the Rohingya refugee crisis, the Strategic Executive Group (SEG), co-chaired by the UN resident coordinator, UNHCR and IOM, coordinates the work of humanitarian organizations on the national level. At the district level, coordination is provided by the Inter-Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) Secretariat, which incorporates representatives of humanitarian organizations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) along with various agencies, NGOs, and sectoral technical groups. In terms of the international response, UNHCR and IOM administer nearly half of the refugee population and manage camps based on a geographic division of responsibility. To facilitate this large scale refugee camp management, partnerships among local, national, international agencies are seen as a 'cost-effective way', whereby knowledge and capacities of partners are shared to manage the operations of the refugee camp and serve the refugees properly (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015).

To better coordinate these partnerships and to improve humanitarian response capacity, in 2005 UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) introduced several approaches "to enhance predictability, accountability, and partnerships" (UNHCR, n.d.:2) One of these new elements is the 'Cluster' approach (Figure

10). “Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. water, health, and logistics. They are designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and have clear responsibilities for coordination” (Humanitarian Response, n.d.). Based on the UNOCHA led 'cluster' system, IOM, with the assistance of DFID (Department of International Development), designed a sector-based coordination process. The sectors include: i) Protection (with two specialized sub-sectors – Gender-Based Violence (GBV), Child Protection (CP)), ii) Food Security, iii) Education, iv) Site Management and Site Development (SMSD), v)Health, vi) Nutrition, vii) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), viii) Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFI), ix) Communication with Communities (CwC), x) Logistics, xi) Emergency Telecommunication, and xii) Coordination. Under the leadership of the Government of Bangladesh and in collaboration with related ministries, each sector assesses the needs and funding requirements and outlines appropriate response strategies for the affected population (here the affected include both the refugees and the host community population affected by the crisis), which culminates in a Joint Response Plan (JRP).

At the camp level, a government official from the RRRC office is appointed as a Camp-In-Charge (CIC). Every decision regarding camp management and planning must be approved by the CIC, in some cases followed by an initial approval of RRRC. Each sector partners with different local and international NGOs that implement the goals and objectives at the camp level. Figure 11 shows the camp areas managed by UNHCR and the sectoral distribution of responsibilities among different partner NGOs. These partner organizations and their workers interact with the refugees directly. In the refugee community at the camp level, there is also a hierarchy. Each camp area is divided into blocks; in cases, these blocks are divided into sub-blocks. The refugees in each camp area

select a representative who they refer to as 'Majhi', and representatives are also chosen at the block and sub-block level. These representatives serve as liaisons between refugees and NGOs and work jointly to distribute resources in the camps. Volunteer refugee groups, including both male and female members, also work with partner NGOs to help gauge the needs and capacities of the refugees and to implement field-level goals and objectives of different sectors.



Figure 10: Cluster Approach, source: OCHA, UN.



Figure 11: UNHCR and partner presence in Ukhiya Upazila, source: UNHCR.

4.4. HOST COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE AND PLANNING

Context and Demographics

According to UNHCR, since August 2017, over 742,000 Rohingya refugees have fled Myanmar to take shelter mainly in Cox's Bazar District. With this recent influx, the total number of Rohingya refugees in those areas has surpassed the local population by two to one, making Cox's Bazar the site of "the densest concentration of refugees in the world" (OCHA, 2017). Cox's Bazar is one of the 20 (out of 64) 'lagging districts' of Bangladesh while Ukhiya and Teknaf are among the 50 most socially deprived Upazilas (out of 492). The frequent cyclones, difficult hilly topography, insufficient and weak infrastructural system along with lack of cultivable land for own food production contribute to the poor living condition in the camps (ACAPS-NPM-Analysis Hub, 2018).

A multi-sector needs analysis done by ISCG to gauge the needs of communities in the Ukhiya and Teknaf region reveals that, while three-fifths of the individual in the host community have completed primary education, a significantly lower population have completed secondary education. Because of a lack of cultivable land, the most common source of income is skilled labor and small businesses. The great influx of refugees as cheap labor has limited local employment opportunities, with 39% of local households reporting that their economic status had deteriorated and 79% of households reporting an increase in the cost of living. Lack of cultivable land also contributes to the dependence of the households on the market, which results in food insecurity and lack of dietary diversity (ISCG, 2019).

Most shelter types in the host communities in Ukhiya and Teknaf are classified as ‘kutcha’ (temporary, made of mud, bamboo, wood and corrugated iron sheets as the roof) and ‘semi-pucca’ (semi-permanent, with walls partially made of bricks, floors made from cement, corrugated iron sheets as roofs). There is still a great reliance on locally collected firewood as cooking fuel in the host community. Although the camps are situated in a cyclone zone and are prone to flooding and mudslides, very few households have received training on how to make their shelters disaster resilient. Households also reported issues with environmental sanitation including the lack of waste management facilities and poor drainage and sewer systems, and the poor road network limits access to other life opportunities like better school, jobs, and health facilities (ISCG, 2019).

Local perspectives on Rohingya refugees and their impact on planning

When Rohingya refugees arrived in Bangladesh in August 2017, local residents were compassionate and welcomed them because of similarities in religion, language, and culture (ACAPS-NPM-Analysis Hub, 2018). However, when refugees outnumbered the number of inhabitants in the local host community, residents started feeling neglected. The arrival of international aid workers in the area led to food insecurity and increases in the cost of living, making it difficult for low-income and moderate-income households to enter the housing market. In areas where refugees and host communities live close together, landowners rent their property either to refugees or to NGOs for use, providing further benefits to affluent members of the host community.

However, local residents also feel that the arrival of refugees has brought positive impacts. Residents with only secondary school degrees are able to obtain employment as

NGO workers with a dignified salary in the camps. These local NGO workers interact with refugees on a daily basis, becoming the de facto representatives of national refugee administration while also gaining a more intimate understanding of conditions in the camps. Although they believe that among Rohingya refugees many people are honest and hardworking, they also find that years of experience of living with conflict have made them ferocious. NGO workers agree that the camps need more durable planning solutions, but at the same time, they feel that this would encourage them to stay in Bangladesh instead of going back Myanmar, making them a burden on local resources:

> I agree with the government to some extent. Refugees are put in discomfort every day continuously. UN agency is also willing to keep them here and leave the place. The situation here came down to emergency level 3 from 4 last year. Whenever it would reach emergency level 1, no foreign expert would be here. They all would go back. They would give a little fund and national experts would continue working here. (Abbas, pers. int., 2019).

As more days pass by and repatriation attempts prove futile, the local host community started thinking that they might get displaced to accommodate the growing number of refugees. "As a part of the host community, I don't now think Ukhiya and Teknaf as part of Bangladesh. It is already encroached by refugee people. They are the majority here now" (Imran, pers.int., 2019). As refugees do not have enough options to earn money, some refugee men have become connected with drug trafficking, and others are accused of being involved in sex trafficking. I attended a seminar on the refugee crisis in Chittagong during my field research period, and most presenters blamed Rohingya refugees for the rising crime levels in Ukhiya and Teknaf districts. Only two researchers claimed that refugees are not the source but rather the victims of different crimes.

On occasion, NGOs have abandoned the planning process because of local opposition and attempts to undermine their work:

> So, we finished design one day and went to the site the next day, instead they found a pond there. People cut a pond overnight because they didn't want to give that land to refugees. Top officers from the government side also visited the site, people there said, we would rather give our lives than giving up on this land (Burak, pers. int., 2019).

In some places, especially where local people and refugees living near each other, the environment is less hostile. Here, any development intended for refugees benefits the host community as well, giving them the sense they are looking out for each other. An NGO worker, Imran, explained his experience working in such a context:

> Refugees took shelter in local Bengali people's houses. They paid money or portion of their rations in return. They need each other for survival. An old lady has some property in the area which has minimum land value. She had no earnings form this land before. But now she is renting the land to10 Rohingya families and they are paying her money or portion of their ration for that. So, they have deep interdependency on each other. I have seen the host community in Teknaf getting benefitted from the presence of Rohingyas. At first, when I had to work with both communities, I saw that people from the host community are thinking about the benefits and wellbeing of the refugee community. At first, I didn't understand their reason. Later I realized they have mutual benefits and that's why they are interested in the wellbeing of each other (Imran, pers. int., 2019).

In different focus groups hosted by NGOs, local people have expressed disappointment with the lack of investment by NGOs and aid organizations, leading donor organizations like the World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) to pursue initiatives to develop the infrastructure in host communities. However, as the needs of host communities are diverse and dependent on local contexts, such investment requires thorough needs assessments to be successful. Also, materials provided to refugees cannot be offered to host communities, as this would be ‘disgraceful’ and offensive to them (Manita, pers. int., 2019). Thus, in-depth communication with the host community through focus group discussions is necessary to gauge their needs.

Chapter 5: Emergence of Impermanence and Adhocracy

From the emergency of the early refugee crisis to the protracted refugee situation, how refugee camps should be planned, designed, and maintained is still an unsettled issue. Different (f)actors play critical roles in determining the planning paradigms of refugee camps. In the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, planning authorities have to deal with several concerns and conflicts at different levels every day, and those confrontations shape the sense of transience in the refugee camp.

5.1. Political reality and the host Government policy

From the beginning of the refugee crisis, the government of Bangladesh saw it as a short-term challenge, taking measures with a goal of ultimate repatriation of the Rohingya refugees to Myanmar and thus averting the prospects of long term multi-year planning (International Crisis Group, 2019). Although the Rohingya refugees are eager to go back to Myanmar, the reluctance of the Myanmar government to ensure the security of the Rohingyas and to restore their citizenship rights has resulted in two failed repatriation processes, without a single Rohingya refugee going back in Myanmar. The lack of effort and commitment by the Myanmar government to take back the Rohingya refugees suggests that the large-scale return of Rohingya refugees will not happen anytime soon. Bangladeshi officials believe that the country will be hosting the Rohingya refugees for a long time (International Crisis Group, 2019).

According to a report by the International Crisis Group (2019), although the government of Bangladesh is well aware of the prospective protracted Rohingya refugee situation, officials are reluctant to engage in long-term planning for Rohingya refugees for

several reasons. Any visible long-term planning approach would encourage the Myanmar government to delay the repatriation process, and also would give a reason to international partners to avoid taking the necessary steps towards repatriation. This, in turn, would demoralize the Rohingya refugees and might encourage them to engage in different criminal activities to provide for themselves, or to turn to hostilities to force political change. Long-term refugee camp planning would also encourage the remaining Rohingyas in Myanmar to flee into Bangladesh and lead to local unrest, as people in host communities in Cox's Bazar see the Rohingya refugees as "both a drain on the local economy and a source of insecurity" (International Crisis Group, 2019, p. 10).

This political reality has led the government of Bangladesh to restrict the use of permanent materials in the Rohingya refugee camps. By providing the refugees with a sense of impermanence and exclusion, by making them struggle to obtain necessities of life, and by keeping them largely dependent on external aid, a constant tension is maintained in the refugee camp. Abraham, an NGO worker who has worked in the refugee camps for about one and a half years, explained how the political reality is shaping this sense of transience:

> Last year, the government used to say, we would take care of the refugees. But this year already they have changed their tone. Now they are saying it is not possible for us to handle this crisis alone. They are creating pressure on UN organizations by saying they have to take care of the refugees. The government doesn't provide livelihood opportunities for these refugees, as their tendency to stay here would increase. Myanmar would also not show interest in taking them back (Abraham, pers. int., 2019).

Bravin, an architect working with a local NGO, also added,

> The government of Bangladesh doesn't want the refugees to even plant trees there. They fear that then refugees would not go from this country. They want refugees to be dependent on aids (Bravin, pers. int., 2019).

In this way, an unsustainable built environment premised on impermanence is produced, with an aim to prevent the refugees from having a sense of belonging to the place they now live.

Another measure that the Government of Bangladesh has taken to reduce the rising congestion in the current camp area is relocating 100,000 Rohingya refugees to a distant island called Bhasan Char. Both international aid organizations and Rohingya refugees have expressed concerns about this relocation, as the island is vulnerable to frequent flooding and landslides and is isolated from the mainland. The Government of Bangladesh has been labeling this as a 'temporary arrangement' (Paul, Baldwin & Marshall, 2018). In this 'temporary' domain, the refugees would be provided with durable shelters made of hollow bricks and corrugated sheets, livelihood opportunities through agriculture and fishing, better services, and security. Although both the original camps in Cox's Bazar and the new camps in Bhasan Char are termed 'temporary', the built environments lie at the opposite end of the spectrum (Figure 12). The geographically isolated location of Bhasan Char serves the aim of keeping refugees in a 'state of exclusion,' and therefore the built environment has taken a more stable form.

Figure 12: (top) Typical view of Bhasan Char Project, source: Mukta Dinwiddlie Maclaren Architects ; (bottom) typical view of Rohingya refugee camp in Cox's Bazar, source: Author.

5.2. HUMANITARIAN AGENCY AND NGO CAPACITY

Abigail, originally from Russia and now working as a coordinator for ICSG, highlighted the policy of humanitarian organizations regarding carrying out their duty in the refugee camps:

> Nobody wants to be a refugee, nobody wants to be a migrant with having no chance to return. So I think that our goal should be providing them with at least minimum dignity, at least minimum human decency so they can stay until its safe. And when it is safe it is our job to help them go back but it is not our job to force them to go back. Because we have to bear the accountability to them if something happens, it has to be a fair and informed decision. That's really important. Until then, it is our human responsibility, to provide them the minimum decency (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).

About 145 NGO and humanitarian aid agencies with thousands of staff work in the Rohingya refugee camps to bring order and provide the refugees with a sense of dignity and security. Although they are staffed with international and national personnel who bring diversified knowledge and experience through a myriad of creative partnerships in the field, humanitarian aid agencies and implementing NGOs confront many obstacles to achieving their goals in the field.

Funding challenges

With strategic objectives of delivering protection, providing life-saving assistance, and fostering social cohesion, the 2019 Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis provided an estimated USD 920 million to serve the population affected by the Rohingya refugee crisis. The affected population includes 911,000 refugees along with 336,000 people from host communities. As of December 31, 2019, the amount of funding provided had reached USD 636 million, covering 69% of overall needs (Strategic

Executive Group, 2019). With the exception of food security, education, and emergency telecommunications sectors, nine of the 12 management sectors received less than 50% of their estimated need (Figure 13). These funding constraints severely impact the form and shape of the built environment. About the use of impermanent materials in the shelter and infrastructure, Abigail added that,

> Partially it is because of the funding, at the moment if we look at the midterm shelter, its' around $1000 per shelter. If you look around transitional shelter assistance it's around $250- $300 per shelter. So if you multiply that by 280,000…..it's a lot for us to provide (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).

Thus, due to funding constraints in each sector, the provided services barely meet minimum requirements, and sometimes fall below.

Also, the source of funding and its distribution is disparate and poorly coordinated. UNHCR and IOM collect funds from different donors and agencies and distribute them among the sectors as needed, working through different partner NGOs who are involved in the field directly. Sometimes these NGOs also receive funds from other donor agencies, and NGOs may disburse funds to other NGOs working in other sectors. Depending on the funds available to sectors and hence to implementing NGOs, the cost of the same type of project varies depending on the context, location, funding source, and agenda of the NGO and the donor. Before joining the team as an architect, Noah worked for a local NGO as a videographer and documented the lost childhood of Rohingya children in the refugee camps. Noah added,

> They used these documentaries to collect funds from donors. I suggested the NGO to increase the budget for individual learning centers that I would design. But they said that it is their funding agenda- a low-budget school. That is what attracts donors, they think, oh, I have to pay only this much money, then the refugee children can get a school. So the NGO tried to do everything within a low budget….. For every structure, we had a budget of USD 2500. Every expenditure

> was included in this amount including my fee. So I had to keep in mind that I can't do much…… I once suggested developing a cost-effective durable structure taking the help of my students from the architecture department where I teach, but the NGO could not manage funds to support that activity (Noah, pers.int., 2019).

Leah, who is working in another NGO that mainly designs and develops child-friendly spaces in the camps and host communities, expanded on her experience,

> The coverage area of our NGO is the whole camp area and the affected host community area. So if we want to reach each camp, the cost of constructing each center becomes USD 355, we used bamboo and tarpaulin as materials then. Later to make the shelter infrastructure more durable and resilient, we started small interventions like to use bamboo lattice as walls, corrugated sheets up to sill height for protection from rain and water, using cross bracings in the corner to make the shelter weather-resistant, etc. and now our budget is USD 800…the cost of materials in the camp area is also higher, and infrastructure cost is one portion of the center cost, we also have to buy artboards, toys and learning tools for children. So if the infrastructure cost becomes higher, the whole model gets a bit expensive (Leah, pers. int., 2019).

Because of the poor coordination, some NGOs suffer from a lack of funding while other NGOs cannot utilize the funding properly because of the donor's unrealistic criteria and lack of understanding of the camp context. Burak confronted these challenges several times, saying:

> When the humanitarian agency funds any project, they know what we have to face in the camp- they have an idea of how long a project can take time to implement. But most of the cases we get funding from other development agencies who do not work at the field level, they put a superficial idea, superficial need and timeline for a project, like I have to spend such amount of money to build such amount of learning centers in the one-month timeframe- things get very difficult to implement, then we put quantity over quality- just finish all the projects in any way possible (Burak, pers.int., 2019).

According to the World Bank, both the humanitarian and development challenges can be best confronted through partnerships between development agencies and humanitarian actors. However, rigid goal setting and outcome definition sometimes stand in the way for effective collaboration. Funding constraints, inefficient spending of funding, external pressures, and impractical expectations to reach quantifiable outcomes lead to an adhocratic management system. This adhocracy, in turn, leads to the creation of impermanent infrastructure systems that are shaped by the funding available per square foot, rather than by the needs and aspirations of the number of the population served.



Figure 13: 2019 JRP funding update, source: ISCG

Limited technical capacity

One of the constraints that limit the scope of resilient and sustainable planning of the refugee camp areas is the limited technical capacity in terms of design, planning, and construction. Abigail explained that "one of the constraints is the limited capacity to plan. So, we need a lot of site planners to execute the plan, because it is a huge area and a very complex area…it is constantly changing" (Abigail, pers. int., 2019). Considering the large size of the campsite, the aid agencies and NGOs employ very few technical personnel with architecture, planning, and design knowledge, making it difficult to design and execute macro-level site planning. Due to funding constraints, the personnel cuts are getting more severe every year. Abraham, who works as a site development officer in a refugee camp, added that "the funding amounts are decreasing day by day. Last year, we had 3 engineers working in the camp, we had 1300 Rohingya volunteers. We could do massive tasks with this workforce. But this year we can only accommodate 250-300 volunteers. We don't have enough money to support a huge workforce like before" (Abraham, pers. int., 2019).

The lack of technical competency also limits any necessary site modeling and evaluation. Each camp area is unique in terms of climate, terrain, and topsoil quality, making it difficult for planners to accurately model and evaluate hazard risks. Selena is working as an urban planner with the site development and management team in ISCG and explained that,

> The whole camp area has a flood hazard management plan and landslide management plan. But the thing with these analyses are they are done in a 10mX10m pixel. Most of them are done from images or digital elevation level. These are not site-specific and have some level of inaccuracy. So we are thinking of making different types of planning proposals. Suppose you are in a flood-prone zone. Your zone might be designated as critically vulnerable and building any type of structure is prohibited, or you might be in a zone where there is a flood hazard but you need to follow some protocols or rules for flood mitigation and

> you might need to do site analysis verification before building anything. But as there is inaccuracy in the initial simulation, it is difficult to evaluate accurately and decide. Variation of scale causes inaccuracy in the determination of flood risk at various levels (Selena, pers. int., 2019).

Because of varying donor specifications and NGO capacities, infrastructural efficiency varies from one camp to another. Abraham, who has experience working in several camps, explained that,

> UNICEF has better expertise in WASH, health, and child protection shelters. The camps which are managed by UNICEF, they have these facilities and they are in good condition rather than camps funded by other authorities (Abraham, pers. int., 2019).

Along with a lack of personnel with technical know-how in design and planning, there is also a scarcity of skilled workers in the camps. Rohingya refugee men work as day laborers at very low wages (usually BDT 300, USD 3.5 a day) on construction projects in the camp, but they are skilled with bamboo construction, not building methods using brick and concrete. Because of this availability of cheap labor with construction skills in bamboo and woodwork, NGOs and aid agencies chose bamboo as the primary construction material in Rohingya refugee camps. Noah explained that

> All the construction workers were Rohingya. So, I had to keep in mind what they can do and what is difficult for them. They don't know the use of brick in construction but they had good expertise on bamboo. They could do a lot of things with bamboo. So, we prioritized that as our building material (Noah, pers. int., 2019).

To relieve congestion and accommodate the growing refugee population, the shelter sector has designed a two-story bamboo structure with steel reinforcements.

However, officials working in the sector believe they will need to go through an extensive capacity-building process before these structures are built. Abigail added that,

> The thing about the two-story shelter is that it needs to be built. When it becomes two-story the process gets complicated. So, we are looking for methods on how to train people to build those structures themselves (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).

Thus, the lack of technical skills among the people who actually translate plans into reality contributes to the impermanency of Rohingya refugee camps.

Administrative complications

Clashes between political interests and humanitarian policies often hinder planning efforts aiming for sustainable, refugee needs-based development, and serve to reproduce the adhocratic governance system prevailing in the camps. Abigail, who works in the shelter sector, explained the dilemma they face on a daily basis working in the Rohingya refugee camp:

> It is very difficult to have a common agreement and common understanding. So, you know for us it is very important to follow certain standards…..like we need at least 6 ft between shelters so we could have light, we could have ventilation, people can walk. At the same time, the govt says, no, this is too much. You are taking too much space. So how do we find the balance? How do we balance between that? (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).

The diverse arrays of national and international aid organizations, NGOs, donors, and government entities have given rise to a management system that is political, chaotic, and unable to properly accommodate the needs of the refugees. While sharing his experience about the governance structure and policies in the Rohingya refugee camps, Abraham said that,

> We have a guideline for emergency shelters. The shelter sector prepared that guideline and provided it to us. It is not a very practical one. They made this strict guideline based on refugee numbers. According to that guideline, I cannot give a refugee a new shelter until his previous one is completely damaged. I cannot serve the refugee people properly if I completely follow that guideline (Abraham, pers. int., 2019).

Abdal, who has been working with an NGO that has the most extensive network in the camps, explained that planning efforts are futile because of the morass of bureaucracy and red tape:

> There are so many layers of authorization you have to pass to do work. It sometimes becomes difficult for big organization itself to pass those layers. Sometimes it is seen that the budget for your project is approved, design of the project is ready, but govt says, no, we cannot let that project build here. Everything goes in vain. The whole project becomes obsolete (Abdal, pers.int., 2019).

Thus, the distribution of 'aid' and 'care' for refugees gets trapped in the adhocratic system, depriving refugees of services and resources and excluding them from the 'normal' legal framework.

5.3. LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG AGENCIES

The idea of partnerships among different agencies and aid organizations in the humanitarian landscape emerged as a strategy to "shift existing unequal power relations between donor and recipient, improving program sustainability through increased efficiency and achieving common project goals and interests" (Abrahamsen, 2004; Noxolo, 2006; Kunz, 2013; Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015:338). However, these partnerships also entail drawbacks if not executed in a cohesive manner. In the Rohingya refugee camps, NGOs operate in a hierarchical system and lack of coordination among agencies often results in

planning interventions that accentuate the notion of impermanence in the built environment.

In the Rohingya refugee camps, at the sector level, coordination among different sectors plays a crucial role as several sectors have identical goals, objectives, and recipient populations. Cohesive coordination efforts could make the delivery of services appropriate, context-responsive, efficient in terms of space and expenses, and reduce the impact of the 'adhocratic' management system prevailing in the camps. For example, Selena explained that

> Every sector knows which camp needs what facility more. The sector has the full picture. So without any coordination, it is difficult to understand the need of the community. This is happening in the camps- some camps lack many facilities whether some camps have those facilities in abundance. Intra-sectoral coordination is also needed. Like CFS and education do something together by merging their programs. Because we lack space comparing to the facility we need here. So, intra-sectoral coordination can make proper utilization of space. So when a partner organization does things without coordinating with sectors, there is a possibility that we might get dispersed facilities in different camps but effective management and proper utilization of the space are not ensured. It is also important to maintain effective communication and coordination when any plans transfer from sector level to camp level (Selena, pers. int., 2019).

Selena also added that,

> Coordination is a big problem here. The difficulty is that a lot of NGOs work here. They are making really good architecture here. But there are some recommendations by shelter sectors, which they don't follow at all. Like- do not put bamboo directly on the ground, they do not follow these recommendations hardly and when asked about the negligence, they say that's how it works in our country. Now, people who are in charge of sectors, it is not possible for them to monitor the building and construction of every shelter. Thus they give guidelines to follow. But if someone does not follow it there is no way to monitor this. So there are gaps in the planning process and management in the camps (Selena, pers. int., 2019).

As the leading administrators of the Rohingya refugee camps, UNHCR and IOM follow *The Sphere Handbook* and the *UNHCR Emergency Handbook* as standards for the delivery of services in humanitarian responses. When individual projects are distributed to NGOs, they are informed about these standards, but when NGOs turn projects over to individual contractors, they rarely pass on this information. Noah told me that "when I was working, I didn't know a thing about any handbook. I didn't follow any guidelines from the handbook. Later, when I decided to teach about the humanitarian settlements in class, I found out the SPHERE handbook" (Noah, pers. int., 2019). He also added that,

> The instructions before starting a project were common, it would be a temporary shelter, they provided us a list of materials. We had to submit plans to get a permit from the site management office, though I never had to go to get the permit. My job was to design the structure, they basically reviewed the plan, 3D view of the structure, and list of materials we were using. All materials needed to be of a temporary nature, even we had restrictions on using brick- they would specify how much brick we could use and in which part of the structure. We used brick till 1-2 ft sill level of the structure so that rain or water could not enter inside. The floor could be solid but the roof was needed to be of temporary material (Noah, pers. int., 2019).

The only guidance that is clearly passed down from the NGOs to individual planners and architects is how to bolster the sense of impermanence through materials and built form. There are also guidelines that specify how to make structures with impermanent materials relatively durable, but due to a lack of coordination and communication, these instructions are not passed down properly to those actually responsible for construction in the field.

5.4. LACK OF CONTEXTUAL RESPONSE IN MICRO AND MACRO-LEVEL PLANNING

The politics of impermanence complicate any context-insensitive design, planning, and management approaches in the Rohingya refugee camps. While refugee crisis is indeed emergencies in nature and immediate responses are needed to ensure the protection, safety, and well-being of refugees, which planning approaches to pursue is still a matter of debate among designers, planners, and architects working in refugee camps. As a planner working in Rohingya refugee camps, Selena is still struggling with this question. "Another challenge is about the conception of the planning process and the time frame of planning. Planning comes to us as a thing that needs thinking and analysis for a long time. And emergency needs instant responses, which is a different direction than long term planning" (Selena, pers. int., 2019). Abigail also added,

> This is a living thing. It is not a museum. It is not if I leave this thing at a place here, tomorrow it is going to be in the same place. So the problem also is that a lot of time the site plan happens, but by the time it is done, the things in the ground change (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).

In the case of the Rohingya refugee camps, the built environment took shape during the early emergency period and was in large part spontaneously developed by the refugees themselves. Since the everyday influx of refugees was so great, they built their shelters wherever they could find a space using the materials provided by the aid organizations. Later, no formal partnerships were established with external institutions to pursue macro planning of the refugee camp area, and there is little involvement by planning or architecture organizations in the Rohingya refugee camps. An international seminar on the displaced community was organized at Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET), the leading university in Bangladesh in January 2019, and architects, planners, engineers, and government officials were invited to talk about the Rohingya

refugee community. The scope of the seminar was limited to sustainable architecture solutions, and planning obstacles, possible systems; integrating refugees or local residents in planning processes were not discussed. Noah, one of the organizers of the seminar, explained why the issue of the sustainability of Rohingya refugee camps was viewed through such a narrow lens:

> In that seminar, we didn't talk about providing livelihood opportunities in Rohingya refugee camps at all. We only talked about the shelter and the environment. Planners and architects in Bangladesh still do not consider providing for livelihood opportunities within their scope of work. Architects think that our only responsibility is to design the structure itself, not anything else. That's why we have problems. Everything is interrelated and we hardly recognize that through our work (Noah, pers. int., 2019).

While there is a lack of understanding of the scope and context of macro-level planning in refugee camps, there is also a lack of response to the micro-level site-specific context in the Rohingya refugee camps. Foreign experts and architects working remotely in other parts of the country sometimes fail to understand the environmental, economic, social, and political context of refugee camps. Thus, the insensitive approaches add to the adhocratic system and accentuate the transient nature of the built environment making. Abdal, who has been living in Cox's Bazar and working as an architect for an NGO, expanded on the necessity of understanding the holistic context of the camp area by describing his experience working with architects who never visited the camps they were designing:

> …And then they send you design with brick pointing. The workers here don't know about this technique. They don't take any help from engineers and architects at the early phase nor do they understand the camp context. Material cost and labor costs here are higher than in other parts of the country. They sent us a budget which they prepared according to material and labor costs in Dhaka. When they came here, we told them to sit with engineers here and to prepare the budget document again. The budget doubled, but the previous budget got sanctioned

> earlier. So we have to build a project with the fund estimated in the previous budget. So we made alterations in the design and now it doesn't fully serve its purposes. The budget you need to do projects in Dhaka, it gets doubled here- that they don't understand (Abdal, pers. int., 2019).

He also added,

> Aesthetics plays little role in designing buildings here. Here the prime focus should be functionality. No matter how beautiful your buildings are, during monsoon, rain would fall through the roof. That's the nature of rain here. Rain in Bangladesh is not as same in other parts of the world. UN agency hired some designers at first, who came from Russia and European countries. It is difficult for them to understand the nature of rain here. Here rain comes from every direction- that's the reality. They made shelters with a gabled roof with a slope on one side, with an empty space on the upper part of the shelter for wind circulation. Master architects from Bangladesh also have iconic designs here. But you can stay in those shelters when it is raining. This type of aesthetic doesn't make any sense here (Abdal, pers. int., 2019).

Rohingya refugees are struggling every day to cope with an alien environment and society. When the built environment does not respond to their needs and aspirations, they feel more isolated and more conscious of their status as a ‘matter out of place’.

Chapter 6: Embracing the challenges of Impermanence and Adhocracy

The factors discussed in the previous chapter contribute to the adhocratic management and planning of the Rohingya refugee camps, leading to a sense of impermanence and accentuating the Agambenian view of refugee camps as a 'state of exclusion'. However, emerging practices in the Rohingya refugee camps have become incorporated into a strategy of 'resiliency humanitarianism,' which helps refugees "think of the camp in terms of community development, with camp life providing the experiences through which refugees are to refashion themselves as resilient, entrepreneurial subjects" (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015, p. 348).

6.1. LEVERAGING COMMUNITY CAPACITY

In the Rohingya refugee camps, where resources and manpower are limited, leveraging the capacity of the refugee community can help to serve their needs. Rather than viewing refugees as disempowered people eking out a life in a space of exception, incorporating them as active participants in the development of an environment where they can live and interact as a community can be both cost-effective and sustainable.

When refugees first arrived during the 2017 influx, they were coming in large numbers every day, and the aid organizations could not build enough shelters for them. Every household was given kits with bamboo, tarpaulin, and ropes, and they made their shelters any way they could. Now that the emergency period has ended, aid organizations seek to upgrade the shelters to a minimum standard by leveraging the capacity of refugees. According to Abigail,

> We can't forget that these people have the capacity. So, when we are providing shelter, if we are looking at the community, different household has different needs, different household has different sizes, they have different preferences and in huge amount. So we dot not hope to find the same house fine for everybody. So when the household has freedom of choice, basically they can make arrangements according to their needs (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).

The refugee community used to live in wooden houses in Myanmar (Figure 14). A typical Burmese house is elevated from the ground on sturdy wood, walls are made of either wood or bamboo, while thatched roofs or roofs with corrugated metal are found most prominently (World Monuments Fund, n.d.). Even though most of the refugees are not able to build with materials like brick and concrete, they are very skilled in woodwork and it is easy for them to apply those skills in bamboo construction. The abundance of this skill in the Rohingya refugee community has also shaped the decision to use bamboo as the main construction material in the camps. The craftsmanship of Rohingya workers also helped the architects and designers working in the camp to develop striking and aesthetically unusual structures. Mostafa designed a women-friendly space in Camp 4 Extension, and he explained how the skills of Rohingya refugee workers helped him create a unique built form that accommodates the needs and inputs of Rohingya people and provides them with a sense of belonging and ownership,

> In the structure (Figure 15), bamboo posts are not straight. Some are irritatingly tilted/off-centered – clearly an error (in "trained" architect's eye), but not an error to the Rohingya laymen…. Shahin Shikder a middle-aged foreman played a vital role in the construction. Another one was Monir- the Rohingya bamboo craftsman. These two people gave a lot of design input…….. In this project, we could make room for everyone to be creative. In other places, workers wouldn't show up in time. Here, they wouldn't leave for lunch (Mostafa, 2019).

Figure 14: Two types of Burmese houses made of wood and bamboo, source: World Monuments Fund.

Figure 15: Rohingya workmen working with bamboo, woods, and learning brickworks, Source: Mostafa, Context BD.

With an estimated 211,383 households in need of shelters and other basic needs, and with the population increasing every day, the refugee camps are getting increasingly

congested. This makes it difficult to find spaces to site communal structures. Also, in the patriarchal Rohingya community, some community services targeted towards vulnerable members of the community, such as awareness and counseling sessions for new mothers and pregnant women, are not favored by the male members of the community. Because of this, NGOs run a home-based model to conduct such sessions 2-3 days in a week in any shelter in a block. These home-based models bring both male and female members under the same roof, raising their awareness about gender-based oppression and violence such as dowry, polygamy, eve-teasing[5], and rape.

Rohingya households who give consent to hold these sessions in their shelters receive money to improve their shelters, including bamboo lattice, more poles, and metal hooks to reinforce their walls, or cement to improve their pucca[6] floor. The Majhis in the community coordinate with the NGOs and community members to facilitate this trade of materials in return for hosting the awareness and counseling sessions. These home-based engagement models make it easier for the NGOs to gauge the needs of the refugees and strengthen the relationships between NGOs and the Rohingya community. Drawing on Simone (2008), a form of emergency governance emerges through this arrangement, whereby "actors increasingly rely on a variety of provisional mechanisms, including much informal local networking, to transmit information and to conduct negotiations" (Simone, 2008, p. 20). The temporary use of existing shelter infrastructures for these sessions helps leverage community capacity and generate a sense of responsibility among the refugees, and the arrangement serves as a means for refugee households to improve their shelters, which is a significant material gain considering the transient nature of the refugee camp.

[5] Eve teasing is a common euphemism in South Asia for sexual harassment of women in public areas by men (Talboys et al, 2017).

[6] The term pucca means 'solid' and 'permanent'. Pucca housing refers to dwellings that are designed to be solid and permanent. This term is applied to housing in South Asia built of substantial material such as stone, brick, cement, concrete, or timber.

Along with these home-based models of communal services, aid organizations and NGOs also visit communal structures like mosques, madrasas, tea stalls, and community centers to better understand the necessities and aspirations of Rohingya refugees. Using the Rohingya youths—both male and female—as volunteers, camp managers leverage the power of community bonds as a resource to convey different messages to refugees. These refugee volunteers have become integral parts of the camp management system and a vital conduit of communication between the camp authorities and the refugees. Here, the volunteers act as interlocutors of emergency governance, opening up the possibility of some alternative kind of communication that itself may generate new ways of working (Simone, 2008).

Faraz has been living in Camp 4 since September 2017. He passed the 'Matriculation Examination'[7] in Myanmar before coming to Bangladesh, and now he works as a tutor. He usually spends 6 hours a day volunteering in the camps to raise awareness about dowry, polygamy, and child marriage to men. He met me outside the WFS of Camp 4 and shared his experience with me:

> I usually go to tea stalls and community centers and tell the men about the negative consequences of dowry, polygamy, etc. I explain to them how these are prohibited in our religion. I also tell people that even if these practices were common in our country, we cannot practice them here. The law of this country is different and we have to follow those rules, these Bengali people have sheltered us and we should not make ourselves a burden to them by practicing these. At first, people did not want to listen to me. Then I communicated my words through the imams and muajins in mosque and madrasa. People are slowly understanding

[7] The University Entrance Examination is commonly known as Matriculation Examination in Myanmar, it is an academic examination administered to 10th standard students at all schools in Myanmar, including government schools, comprehensive schools and private boarding schools, for students seeking university admission.

> what I am trying to say. They respect me. They know I am a volunteer, I work for that NGO. Sometimes they come to me to share their sufferings, or to inform that certain household is marrying off their 9 years old daughter- to refrain them from doing so; to tell the NGO people to fix their home or someone has not been working for long- to arrange some work for him. I am a volunteer only, I can't do much but I can deliver those messages to the NGO. I feel happy and honored when people of my community listen to my words and come for help to me when they need it (Faraz, pers. int., 2019).

6.2. CAPACITY BUILDING AND EMPOWERMENT

Along with using local capacity as a resource, ISCG is looking for ways to improve communication and cooperation among agencies working in different hierarchical levels in the camp management system. Selena explained how these coordination efforts can be accompanied by technical skill building among refugees:

> A CIC might not know which areas in his/her camp fall under the flood hazard zone. So we need to train them, provide them with a map to understand. Let them know that which part of their camp is vulnerable to flood risk and what measure should be taken to build something on that part. If even partner organizations bring funding by themselves and want to build something on your site what things you need to discuss with them and how you should proceed with ground verification and other things. This process is not followed properly and there are some gaps in the process (Selena, pers. int., 2019).

Although opportunities to learn livelihood skills are limited for Rohingya refugees, camp authorities are seeking to develop their skills in building resilient structures with the materials available to them. When I visited the ISCG office, Abigail showed me pictures of calendars they distribute among refugees to educate them about different construction techniques to make their shelters resilient against flooding, landslides, and other natural disasters. The calendar is printed in both English and the Burmese language (Figure 16). Abigail added,

We provided kits of materials to the households. Because we don't have the capacity to build for everybody. Also, with this kit of material, we provided them technical guidance, technical guidance on how to build the shelter. It doesn't give you the size of the shelter, but it tells you how you need to do the bracings, the foundations, you need to use this type of joint and things like that to make your shelter more durable and all the technical things (Abigail, pers. int., 2019).



Figure 16: Calendar pages with instruction in English and Burmese languages for strengthening bamboo structures, source: IOM

Other than these centralized efforts, NGO workers, architects, engineers, and planners who work with Rohingya day laborers take it upon themselves to teach refugees construction techniques that they can later use to upgrade their structures. For example, Noah investigated one of the shortcomings of Rohingya shelters and helped the refugees overcome it:

> The shelters Rohingya people make for themselves, they hardly provide any types of ventilation there. They didn't consider putting windows in their shelters. Or the shelters were put so close together that there was no scope of putting a window on sidewalls. So we placed the structures in such a way that there remained some gap to operate a window. I also taught them how to put windows in bamboo structures. I feel like this is also a kind of empowerment (Noah, pers. int., 2019).

The community structures in the Rohingya refugee camps are of semi-permanent nature with brick walls to sill level and cement floors. However, the refugees are not familiar with this type of construction and hiring day laborers from outside of the camp increases project costs. In response to this dilemma, Musad, a structural engineer, helped the refugees who work with him learn these construction techniques. These refugees now work with him on projects: “I trained some workers in Camp 4, they didn't know how to do brickwork. I taught them everything with plaster finishing. Whenever I need help with any project, I can hire them now” (Musad, pers. int., 2019). Thus, the collaboration and capacity building extend a promise of future alliances, where people come to constitute an infrastructure of shared knowledge, skills, and resources.

6.3. RESPONDING TO THE CONTEXT AND COMMUNITY ASPIRATIONS

Fiona has been working with an NGO to develop Children Friendly Spaces (CFS) in the Rohingya refugee camps. Her group is looking for ways to make these centers more resilient as well as reflective of the culture of the Rohingya people. She said,

> After finalizing the prototype layout for the center, we thought about what cultural element can we put in those so that the space becomes more familiar to them. After having multiple focus group discussions with the community, we found two things- shamiana, a type of ceiling drape which acts as an insulator too, and keeps the room colder in hot weather. We also found out they used different patterns in those shamianas. We brought those two elements in our design. We found out that their children love the artwork. They enjoy coloring the center walls. Shamiana, patterns, artwork space for children- we included all those in our design and program of the center, it is replicable in every camp (Fiona, pers. int., 2019).

In addition to Fiona's research group, several groups are working to make the camps livelier by introducing the essence of Rohingya culture into their designs. These designs help the refugees feel connected with the place and help pique their interest in taking part in the intended programming. When Abdal and his team designed a Women Friendly Space (WFS) in Camp-4 Extension, they used *nipa palm tree*[8] leaves as roofing material instead of thatch or corrugated metal sheets. This material is popular with refugees, as it lasts longer than other roof types when exposed to rain. Although the material is known to refugees, their construction techniques are different and primitive, so Abdal and his team trained the refugees in new ways of using the nipa palm leaves for roofing. They also provided space for refugee laborers to innovate and draw on their skills in the development of the project. He added,

[8] *Nypa fruticans*, commonly known as the nipa palm (or simply nipa) or mangrove palm, is a species of palm native to the coastlines and estuarine habitats of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It is the only palm considered adapted to the mangrove biome. This species is the only member of the genus *Nypa* and the subfamily Nypoideae, forming monotypic taxa (Dowe, 2010, p.83).

> Understanding the context here is so important. Beautiful architecture doesn't add value here. Value can be added in one way- if you can give people comfort. If people find your designed space comfortable that's the real success there. The role of architects and planners here is to ensure the creation of a durable, functional, properly arranged space (Abdal, pers. int., 2019).

Thus, by respecting the context of the refugee crisis and the meaning of this crisis to refugees' life, and by providing them with comfort and a sense of belonging, practices of resiliency humanitarianism may facilitate the adaptation and survival of refugees in a foreign land.

6.4. INFORMAL PARTNERSHIPS AND NEGOTIATIONS

While working together, refugees and NGO workers build relationships of trust and cooperation that positively shape the character of the built environment. Each actor in these informal relationships "carries traces of past collaboration and an implicit willingness to interact with one another in ways that draw on multiple social positions" (Simone, 2004, p. 408). Musada explained that

> You need a lot of connections in every camp to get things done. Especially with the Majhi (Rohingya community leader). You need a large informal connection. the capacity and success of the total framework of a project depend on involvement and networking. Suppose, I am connected to one person, he is connected to the other two Rohingya majhis, majhis are connected to several other volunteers. In this way, there grows a large network and it becomes easy for us to accomplish any job. My phone memory is full of contacts of local majhi, suppliers, workers, even hooligans (Musada, pers. int., 2019).

By accepting the help of this widely connected network, Musada's team once finished a project in only 5 days even though it was scheduled to take one month:

> After the initial contractor failed to finish the project before the deadline, the donor gave us an extension of five days. So we decided, our construction team would take responsibility for construction. It was Ramadan, we built the whole building from scratch in three days. It is not safe to stay in the camp after the evening. We stayed in the camp overnight, we needed a lot of laborers. I just asked one of my colleagues if he had enough Rohingya people who can help us in this project. After that, I just only remember that within three hours, a truck full of Rohingya laborer came to work with us. He knew several majhis in other camps and they gathered all these people to work in our project…..the majhi of the camp where we were working, kept the laborers motivated to work on this project even after the working hours. We also paid them for working overtime- actually, we paid them four times than the regular payment. We were doing all things together- metal framework, building envelope, roof, wooden truss, brickwork, floor finish- everything is going on simultaneously. Also, there is no water, water is a crucial component of any building construction. We decided to create a pond by laying polythene sheets. 4 Rohingya workers just brought water all night from the nearby mosque. It was Ramadan and most of the Rohingya workers used to keep fasts. At around midnight they decided to stop working- we then again told them to increase their fees and also arranged for their sehri…(Musada, pers. int., 2019).

Thus, even given challenges and unfavorable conditions, the informal network of partnerships helped Musada keep the work going. Such informal partnerships allow for a more prompt and situated response to the crisis than hierarchical adhocratic systems. Abraham explained his experience with such informal partnerships:

> We don't have enough technical workforce. We have one engineer per camp and around 5000 shelters. How much he can monitor? He gets 50-60 cases of damaged shelter per day. If he wants to maintain protocol, it would take him days to solve these. In the meantime, people would continue to suffer. In my camp, I told that I don't always need an engineer. I would be responsible for the whole thing. I used my volunteers for this purpose, they go from door to door, report me back and I take responsibility for emergency repairing of those shelters. During monsoon, we get hundreds of shelter cases per day. If we want to maintain protocol, it would only make the situation worse. That's why, though I am not in the shelter team, I voluntarily proposed to do this job with my volunteers. If as a humanitarian volunteer, I cannot serve the refugee community well, what's the point of working here? (Abraham, pers. int., 2019).

Through such partnerships that are cemented by familiarity and trust, emergency governance manifests itself through a social architecture that refugees and camp authorities assemble "using their time, bodies, inclinations, tools and all the material stuff that exists around and within them to reach and connect to public necessities'" (Simone, 2008, p. 31). Using these social structures, refugees negotiate with authorities in order to more promptly and effectively accommodate the needs of the community, thus blurring the sense of impermanence in the built landscapes.

6.5. EVERYDAY PRACTICES OF ADAPTING AND APPROPRIATING

When Aisha was widowed ten years ago, her husband left her a small plot in a village in Rakhine state, Myanmar. She worked as a tailor and lived in a wooden house with her son and paralyzed sister. She came to Bangladesh in September 2017 by crossing the bordering hills with her paralyzed sister after the Myanmar military turned their village into ashes. Everyone suggested she leave her sister behind, but she could not. She came to the Balukhali camp first, where she lived for about eight months, and then she moved to Camp 4 Extension when her shelter in Balukhali was demolished in a landslide. When I met with her inside of her shelter, she was eager to offer me a chair to sit on, but couldn't. Referring to the empty shelter devoid of any furniture, she said, "Whatever little things I had back there, was my own. I never thought in life that I have to come to another country and have to live like this" (Aisha, pers. int., 2019).

Having lost all they owned, people like Aisha are now trying to make a new home in Bangladesh. The shelters in the Rohingya refugee camp are of an impermanent, transient

type. They need constant maintenance. Many shelters are built lower than the street level, so whenever it rains, the floors of the shelters get muddy and unusable.

Halima also invited me to see her shelter. It is a typical makeshift shelter, about 10 ft by 10ft and 7.5 ft in height, without any windows or ventilation systems, housing Halima's whole family of 10 people. I had to bend halfway to enter her space, which is about 6 inches lower than the street level. It does not have any furniture or tools except for some sleeping mats and cooking utensils. She borrowed some cement from workers who were building a toilet a few months ago near her home and mixed the cement with mud to make her floor more durable and livable during monsoon season. She used barriers of polythene sheets to divide the living space into two and another barrier to divide the kitchen from the living space. In one corner of the kitchen, she created a separate space with 3-inch high bamboo sticks and sloped the floor to one corner so that water could drain through. This space is now used as a bathing space for the female member of the house (Figure 17).

Halima’s house layout is typical of most of the makeshift refugee shelters built by refugees on their own. They did not have enough materials or knowledge to make shelters that are functional and well-ventilated, let alone with toilets and bathing facilities. However, in Rohingya culture, it is forbidden for women to take a bath outside or walk past male members of the community after taking a bath. Because of this, households in the refugee camp use all the space available to them to build their shelter in order to construct a bathing space inside. The newly designed camps have communal bathing facilities for females, but they hardly ever use them as they have to cross public pathways and might encounter men after a bath there. The newly designed homes for refugees in Bhasan Char also did not consider the culture and tradition of the refugee communities.

The architects admitted that they never consulted any Rohingya refugees during the design phase, nor did they consider accommodating different family structures. All rooms are identical in shape and size while the service facilities like kitchen, toilet, and bathing space are communal (Tashin, pers. int., 2019), which is not culturally appropriate for the Rohingya community.

Figure 17: Appropriation of space to create bathing space inside a shelter, source: Author.

As the shelters are poorly ventilated and electricity is generated by solar panels, refugees try to save the electricity for the nighttime. Most of the time, the male household members work outside in the camp during the day, while female members spend their time at women-friendly community spaces, which provide a platform for women to gather and learn. I met Khadiza at one of the women-friendly spaces. She had finished her household chores before 9 am and came here as soon as the center was open:

> We do not get much electricity through the solar panel, I have to save it for the night, so I come here early morning with my two-year-old son and stay till 5 pm. Here I can have comfortable weather, I have people to talk with, to learn from. I learned how to write my name last month and I put my name as a signature for the first time this month instead of a thumb impression. This place is truly my Shantikhana (a place full of peace*)* (Khadiza, pers. int., 2019).

All the women-friendly spaces in the camps are known as *Shantikhana* (places full of peace), as these provide them with capacities to be empowered (Figure 18). In the Rohingya community in Myanmar, the girls could go to school up to age 12 and learn Burmese, English, Mathematics, and Arabic. After age 12, they had to stay home learning household chores, knitting, and tailoring. In Bangladesh, however, there has been a major transformation in the life of Rohingya girls and women. First, the ration cards are issued in the name of the senior female member of the household, which gives them a measure of power vis a vis male household members they did not have in Myanmar. Second, through these women-friendly community spaces, NGOs have created learning and training opportunities which in some cases become paid opportunities. By becoming wage-earning members of the family, women have more authority over family decisions than they had in Myanmar. For example, Sukhi, an 18-year-old girl, comes to the women-friendly space every day. She received training in knitting and tailoring as well as basic education, and then started working here for six hours a day, earning BDT 1300 (USD 15.28) per month

(approximately two weeks' worth of groceries for a four-member household in the Cox Bazar area). As she said, "I thought of buying a dress for the Eid with my first month's salary, but the dresses in the market were way more expensive than my monthly salary. So, I gave it to my father to buy meat for the Eid day, I was happy to buy food for my family instead" (Sukhi, pers. int., 2019).

Figure 18: Inside of a Women Friendly Space, source: Author.

The government of Bangladesh has permitted NGOs to run awareness programs in the refugee camps, as this reduces the need for surveillance and patrolling. However, this initiative has created a path towards empowerment which the refugees did not have in their home country. Rohingya women have also become aware of their rights from different NGOs. NGOs hold sessions aimed to raise awareness both among men and females about their legal rights, about the negative consequences of child marriage, dowry, polygamy, and domestic violence in community centers, women-friendly spaces, and in homes, and also in the mosques and madrasas with the collaboration of imams and muajins. Legal help and advocacy are also available, and NGO workers now report that the number of cases dropped from 2018 to 2019. Although the tradition of dowry has not been abolished yet, solar panels are now demanded as dowry instead of money or gold jewelry. Because Rohingya men are not used to having women in positions of authority, they strongly oppose women going to Women Friendly Spaces (WFS) to learn about their knowledge and capacities. Also, while women have the opportunity to receive training, Rohingya men are limited to serving as day laborers or as volunteers for NGOs.

The education of youth is another concern in the refugee community. Since the government of Bangladesh has not granted the Rohingyas refugee status yet, they cannot claim a right to education. There are learning centers, but children can only learn Burmese, English, and Mathematics, and only up to age 12. Bengali is not taught since it would help the refugees flee the camp and mix with local communities. After age 12, children have no formal place to receive an education. Refugees have compensated for the absence of educational facilities by hiring people who had received education in Myanmar to teach their children. Not everyone is satisfied with this informal education system. Jia, a volunteer working with an NGO said,

> I can't rely on another person who just has passed the matriculation level study to teach my younger brothers. How can I be sure that what he is teaching to my brothers is the best thing to learn? If there was a school with knowledgeable teachers, then I would not worry about my brother's education." Still, to many, this informal education system is a path toward a better, dignified life. Sakina said, "I am paying someone BDT 800 monthly so that he comes and teaches my son four days a week. I do not know if I would be able to go back and when, if I go back or stay here for a long time, I do not want my son to grow up as an illiterate man. If he becomes educated, he might get a job as a volunteer here, which is much easier and respectable jobs than being a day laborer (Jia, pers. int., 2019).

Rohingyas used to produce their own food and were not dependent on markets in Myanmar. In Bangladesh, however, their options to grow food have become limited. First of all, the land available for agriculture in the camp area is scarce. Because of the overcrowded conditions in the camp, many refugees do not even have a space left over for a small vegetable garden. Also, even though vegetable gardens are allowed near individual shelters, it is forbidden to pursue large-scale agriculture or plant any large trees at the campsite. Growing trees near their shelters would give refugees a sense of belonging, so from the perspective of Bangladeshi authorities, a ban on tree planting is necessary in order to maintain a sense of impermanence and exclusion. Since not every household has room for vegetable gardens, refugees suffer from a lack of a diversified diet. They receive dry goods—staples like rice, lentils, oil, some spices, and snacks—from the World Food Program (WFP), but for meat, fish, and vegetables they rely on the nearby market or local food vendors who come to camps daily. Some also have adopted unique ways of growing vegetable trees by planting seeds in bags of mud, which also serve to protect roofs from heavy winds (Figure 19).

Figure 19: (top) vegetable gardening, (bottom) unique roof gardening; source: Author

Rohingya refugees do not receive any monetary aid. Their only source of cash for clothing and other necessities is so-called ‘cash for work,’ with refugee men and boys working as day laborers or volunteers with different NGOs and women and girls as volunteers or tailors for NGOs. Refugees will also sell or barter things they receive in aid like rice, lentils, and hair and beauty products, and instead buy goods that are more essential for them in the local market.

The community bonds also help refugees cope with this transient state of living. Whenever people have a surplus of building materials like bamboo and ropes, they create a space outside of their house known as a ‘macha’ where people sit and speak with neighbors and other community members. NGOs have introduced different in-home services like sessions about pre-natal care, care guidelines for pregnant women and newborn babies, and workshops about healthy eating and hygiene. Refugee household can give permission to run these interactive sessions in their shelters, which provides another opportunity for the community to learn together and communicate with each other. Refugee volunteers also have become an essential part of the community as they act as a liaison between the NGOs and refugees, which is especially important for households that need special care, such as single-person households and those with elderly and handicapped household members. Since the volunteers are also members of the same community and familiar with Rohyngia culture and tradition, they can assist more newly arrived refugees in navigating camp structures and politics. These community bonds and sense of interdependency is a valuable asset that they do not want to lose. Jamal, an NGO worker said,

> Refugees have created a community here where they live now, they do not want to leave that easily. If you tell them today that you will be given a better shelter,

> better facilities elsewhere and you will have to move, they won't. Wherever they go, they will go with the community, the relatives they have here. That is another reason why Rohingyas are not willing to move to Bhasan Char. If you are taking only 100,000 people there, they know they might have to leave a part of their community, their family behind, and they won't do it (Jamal, pers. int., 2019).

Although these settlements are intended to produce a sense of impermanence, the community bonds developed by refugees provide them with a feeling of belonging and inclusion. Despite all their sufferings and daily struggles, refugees prefer to live in the camp because they believe that staying there can ensure their return to their homes in Myanmar. Mahmuda, a 15-year-old girl who was born in Bangladesh, explained that her father came from Myanmar to Bangladesh during the 1991 influx and they used to live in Chittagong city. Following the 2017 influx, he moved to the refugee camp with his family. "My father said that he wanted to go back to his home back to Myanmar. If we stay in the refugee camp, then perhaps we can go back this time," Mahmuda recalled (Mahmuda, pers. int., 2019).

Ultimately, seen through these everyday practices by Rohingya refugees, the bleak Agambenian picture of the camp is blurred and we come to understand the agency of refugees. As Turner suggests, through these practices, "social life, power relations, hierarchies, and sociality are remolded in the camp" (Turner, 2016, p. 143).

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Ilcan and Rygiel (2015) suggest that the social architectures described in the previous chapter prepare refugees for the idea that camp life is not temporary and transitional. In so doing, they turn refugees into "neoliberal resilient subjects who are encouraged to adapt to, rather than resist, the conditions of their humanitarian sufferings" (Ilcan &Rygiel, 2015, p. 348). However, I would argue that everyday negotiations with camp authorities do not necessarily increase the sense of belonging to the host country nor a greater acceptance of their refugee status. That is to say, the need for permanence is not synonymous with the need for acceptance and belongingness. These tactics only reflect the aspirations of the refugees to live their life with minimum human dignity and protection, so that they can go back to their country with adequate resources to rebuild their communities. This aspiration manifests through their reluctance to move to Bhasan Char, which promises a 'better' version of refugee life through the provision of needed services and facilities in exchange for the exclusion from other communities (both refugee and host communities). The Rohingya refugees do not want a 'permanent and secure' future that provides them with no promises to return to Myanmar.

Thus, the planning of Rohingya refugee camps requires a different approach that is not premised on providing a sense of impermanence through adhocracy. Planning approaches towards refugee camps should instead be "multiplanar- a relational approach of dynamic complexity to understanding and working with contingencies of place, time, and actant behavior" (Hillier, 2008, p. 24). By understanding the factors that lead to the adhocratic camp management system as well as the field-level practices, politics, and negotiations among different planning actors, a multiplanar approach may "offer potential

for thinking through collaboratively the ways in which particular strategic imaginaries might affect human and non-human actants" (Hillier, 2008, p. 42). She goes on to say, in a comment with great relevance for the Rohingya refugee camps, that "plans and strategies are never so much complete as 'enough for now'….it is a rhizomic consequentialist approach: a what might happen if…' approach that offers the potential to think otherwise" (Hillier, 2008, p. 42). A refugee situation ultimately culminates in three ways—repatriation, relocation, and integration—and planning strategies may embrace a combination of all three potential outcomes. That is to say, starting with the emergency period of a refugee crisis, a multiplanar planning approach would seek ways to accommodate all possible end solutions. Rather than keeping the refugees in a state of exclusion, we need to provide them with opportunities, services, and facilities to ensure their quality of lives as an individual. But we also need to see them as members of a community and be cognizant of their demands, needs, and power, thus facilitating their transition to a 'post-refugee' life. From a multi-planar perspective, plans are never complete nor completely outcome-oriented. Instead, this approach acknowledges the constraints of impermanence and adhocracies but also welcomes the everyday appropriating practices of refugees.

By keeping refugees isolated and excluded, refugee camps constitute transient spaces designed to reproduce a sense of impermanence and to depoliticize the refugee population. The introduction of humanitarian agencies to manage the refugee camp through superficial neoliberal goals has led to an adhocratic governance system, whereby refugees are required to become resilient participants in the maintenance of the camps without demanding changes to facilities and services. However, this study of existing Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh and the proposed relocation plan for Rohingya has shown

that the meaning of impermanence changes depending on the planning context. Once the rule of exclusion of refugees from the immediate surrounding areas has been established, the line between permanence and impermanence becomes blurred. This is because the sense of impermanence and the adhocratic governance system of refugee camps are not merely products of political machinations. They also stem from the interactions of numerous other factors: the tradition of technocratic top-down planning practice, the paradoxical combination of humanitarian services and neoliberal development agendas, and the geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions of both the refugees and the host communities.

While refugees are viewed as passive recipients of aid, refugees situate themselves as an active negotiating actor in the impermanent and adhocratic realm of the refugee camp. By using their capacity, cooperation, and connections as human capital, by utilizing the porous spatiality of the camps to shape their built environment, and by administering emergency governance, Rohingya refugees are transforming the politics of impermanence and adhocracy in order achieve their rights. Everyday practices of appropriating do not necessarily translate into acceptance and belonging to the host community, but instead serve to gain a measure of control over their future, despite strategies of exclusion and the production of impermanence in refugee camps.

Glossary

CIC- Camp -In- Charge

ICJ- International Court of Justice

IOM – International Organization for Migration

ISCG – Inter Sector Coordination Group

OHCHR- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

RRRC- Office of Refugee Relief and Repatriation

UN- United Nations

UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF- United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNOCHA - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Work Agency

WFP – World Food Program

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